From John Jay to Benjamin Goodhue, 29 March 1799
To Benjamin Goodhue
Albany 29 March 1799
Dear Sir
The Letters which you was so obliging as to write to me from Philada., have been recd., and disposed of in the manner you requested—1
The Information communicated in those Letters has given me much concern— The Expediency of the President’s Declaration that he would not send another minister to France, until he should recieve assurances &c. was not in my Judgment unquestionable. there are political considerations against it, and there are others in its favor. Such a Declaration however was made, and the propriety of it seems to have been acquiesced in.2
It is to be wished that Mr. Murray had been more reserved in his Conversations with the French Secretary,3 on the Subject of our national Differences. those matters were foreign to his Department; and I presume they were not within his Instructions. those conversations have facilitated overtures which are calculated, and I believe designed, to perplex and divide our Councils, and to mislead public opinion—
The Manner in which Mr. Murray transmitted these ^overtures^ to the President, is such a Deviation from the official and customary Course, as (unless adopted for extraordinary and substantial Reasons) is certainly exceptionable.— nor does any Reason occur to me, why the President thought it proper to omit communicating the overtures to the Secretary of State: such is my Confidence in the Patriotism of the President, and also of the Secretary, that every Indication of Want of Confidence between them, appears to me singular, and to be regretted—
Whether these overtures (considered in Connection with the before mentioned Declaration of the President, and other existing Circumstances) should have been accepted—or encouraged—or rejected—or neglected—are Questions not free from Doubts. I am inclined to think that immediate attention to them was neither necessary nor adviseable, and that they had not as yet acquired such a Degree of Maturity, as to call for any formal national Act. But viewing this Subject in all its various Relations, I suspect it is one of those on which Statesmen might naturally be led to opposite Opinions, by the Difficulty of precisely estimating the Weight and Balance ^of^ the many and diverse Considerations comprehended in it. Much might be said, but not to much purpose; for whatever Remarks may be applicable to the origin, Progress and present State of this perplexing Affair, it is as it is.— nothing therefore remains, but to make the best of the Situation into which we are carried; and to avail ourselves of all the advantages to be derived from the united Talents and Efforts of the best Friends to our Country & Government.— The apprehensions entertained from the projected negociation may not be extensively realized; and Events may yet arise to press the Directory into proper Measures relative to this Country— measures not to be expected from their Sincerity, or Sense of Decorum or Justice.—
I am for aiding and adhering to the President, and for promoting the best understanding between him and the Heads of the Departments. Notwithstanding what has happened, I hope his real Friends will not keep at a Distance from him; nor withhold from him that Information, which none but his Friends will give him. Union, sedate Firmness, and vigorous Preparations for war, generally afford the best Means of counteracting the Tendencies of insidious professions, and of too great public Confidence in them— With great Esteem and Regard I am Dear Sir Your most obt. Servt
John Jay
The Hon’ble. Benjn. Goodhue Esqr.
ALS, NNYSL (EJ: 02872). WJ, 2: 288–90; HPJ, 4: 256–58. Benjamin Goodhue (1748–1814), of Salem, Mass., a Harvard-educated merchant and Federalist politician, who served in the House of Representatives from 1789 to 1796, and in the Senate from 1796 to 1800, after which he retired from public service. Goodhue was a member of the “Essex Junto” of High Federalists associated with AH, TP, and other New England Federalists.
1. Goodhue’s letters have not been found. For an extract of a later letter detailing JA’s conflicts with AH and members of the Senate over their disapproval of appointments for Adams family members to office, see Goodhue to TP, 2 June 1800, E, NNC (EJ: 13029), enclosed in TP to JJ, 17 June 1800, ALS, NNC (EJ: 09515).
2. After France had refused to receive or negotiate with Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry, JA had announced in his message to Congress of 21 June 1798, that he would “never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful and independent nation.” Journal of the House, 3: 347; DeConde “Role of William Vans Murray,” 187.
3. William Vans Murray (1760–1803) of Maryland served in the House of Representatives from 1791 to 1797; JA then appointed him U.S. minister to the French-dominated Batavian Republic (Netherlands), where he served until 1801. In the aftermath of the XYZ Affair, Talleyrand had cultivated Murray as an intermediary to JA, working through Louis-André Pichon (1771–1854), whom he sent to The Hague as secretary to the French legation. Pichon was acquainted with Murray because he had served in the U.S. as secretary to French ministers Genet and Fauchet. Pichon showed Murray correspondence from Talleyrand expressing willingness to reconcile differences and promising to receive American diplomats. Rather than acting through Secretary of State TP, Murray conveyed this information directly to JA along with a copy of a letter of 28 Sept. 1798, from Talleyrand to Pichon confirming French willingness to negotiate. These overtures were opposed by AH, TP, and other Hamiltonian Federalists, including the Essex Junto, who argued they were intended to incite divisions in the U.S. and would slacken the defense effort. JA, without consulting his cabinet, on 18 Feb. 1799, sent the Senate a copy of Talleyrand’s letter with a message proposing another attempt at negotiations, though without reducing U.S. war preparations. JA nominated Murray as minister plenipotentiary to France to conduct the negotiations, but AH, TP, and their congressional allies insisted on adding two other Federalists, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut and Patrick Henry of Virginia (later replaced by William R. Davie of North Carolina), in another sectionally balanced commission, who were not to depart for France until formal confirmation was obtained that they would be properly received. The commissioners negotiated the Convention of 1800, signed on 30 Sept. 1800. The convention, which failed to secure French payment of reparations for ships and cargoes seized since 1793, was first rejected by the Senate in December 1800, then approved with reservations in February 1801. Pichon, now charge d’affaires in Washington, advised the French government to ratify the treaty as revised, and TJ, now president, directed Murray to return to Paris from The Hague to negotiate ratification of the treaty by France. This he accomplished on 31 July 1801. The Senate approved the revised treaty on 19 Dec. 1801, thereby officially ending the Quasi-War with France. ASP: FR, 2: 239–40, 241–44; PAH, 22: 487–90, 503–5, 544–47; Executive Journal, 1: 313–14; DeConde “Role of William Vans Murray,” 185–94.