I concieve it my Duty to state to Your Excellency the Situation of and proceedings in the two Suits instituted against Mary Lindsley and others, and against Abraham Miller, by Samuel Fowler and Jonathan Lyman Citizens of the State of Massachusets for the Recovery of Lands situate within the Counties of Steuben and Tioga in this State, to which the Plaintiffs claim Title by Virtue of and under Grants from the State of Connecticut—.1

These Suits were commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut— A Judgement by Default was obtained in the Suit against Abm. Miller— it has been waived and a Plea accepted— Pleas to the Jurisdiction of the Court are now interposed in both Suits averring that the Lands in Controversy are in fact within the State of New York, and that the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New York, and the Courts of the State of New York have exclusive Jurisdiction of the Subject-Matter of Controversy— The Truth of this Plea is contested by the Plaintiffs and Issue is joined thereon—.

For the Purpose of trying this Issue Col. Hamilton and myself attended at the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, held at Hartford on the Eighteenth day of September last, the great Object of the Plaintiffs appeared to be to obtain a Trial by a Jury composed of the Citizens of the State of Connecticut. To prevent a Measure so adverse to the unbiassed Administration of Justice, and so hazardous to the Interests of this State, we thought proper to challenge the array of the Jury, and assigned two Reasons for Causes of such Challenge. 1. that the Deputy Marshal who had arrayed the Pannel of the Jury was a Citizen, Inhabitant, and Freeman of the State [p. 604] of Connecticut. 2. that he was a Claimant under the State of Connecticut of part of the Lands contained in the above mentioned Grant—

These causes of Challenge were severally insisted on as valid; and after a very lengthy Argument the Court thought proper to disallow the first, and to admit the last. By this Decision the Trial of the Cause in the State of Connecticut is merely postponed; and if the Judgement of the Court, which at that Time presided, should be hereafter confirmed, a Connecticut Jury will be competent to the Trial of the Question. Of the Legality of this Decision, the Counsel associated with me, and myself entertain, as we think well founded Doubts; but on a Question so extremely important to the Interest of this State, a Confidence in our own Judgement ought not to induce us to hazard a renewal of a Discussion which may lead, in the Event of a concurrence of Opinion by the next court, to a prejudiced hearing of the present Controversy—.

The principal Reason assigned by the Court for disallowing the first cause of challenge was, that the Laws of the United States had not made any provision for the Trial of a Cause Situated as this is, except by a Jury of the District from whose Court the Process had issued—. If no such provision really does exist, the propriety of one is manifest and the Interests of this State are so deeply implicated in the Subject, as to entitle it to the immediate Attention of its Government—.

In all Controversies similar to the present, it must be essential to a fair Decision, that the Supreme Court of the United States should possess the power of ordering the removal of the proceedings from the respective Circuit Courts in the several Districts, into the Supreme Court, to the End that a Jury may be summoned to try the cause, from a District of the United States not interested in the Controversy; or that some other adequate provision should be made for a Trial exclusive of the Jury of either State interested or concerned— A Representation of this Subject on the part of our Government in such a mode as shall be deemed the most eligible, to the Congress of the United States, it is presumed from its obvious Equity and Propriety, would certainly produce the desired effect, and thereby ensure to this State, a just and ample Decision of the present Question—.2

The Expences attending the Defence of these Suits have already been and will continue to be very considerable. From the Zeal of the opposite Party, we are to calculate on every possible exertion to promote their Success— They have employed, at very great Expence, Counsel of the first repute, and they appear to prosecute their Claim with great ardour and much apparent Confidence. From these Considerations I judge that the charges in the [p. 605] further Defence of this Business: will be rather enhanced than diminished: and I submit to your Excellency the propriety of some Legislative provision specially defining the Allowance to Witnesses — I have hitherto nearly confined myself to the Payment of their Actual Expences— they claim an additional Allowance, and it appears to me just that a reasonable one should be made to them—.3 I have the Honor to be Your Excellency’s most obedient Servant,