To Thomas Jefferson from Stephen Cathalan, Jr., 3 August 1804
From Stephen Cathalan, Jr.
Marseilles the 3d. August 1804.
Dear Sir & most respected Friend!
I had the honor of paying you my respects on the 27th. July ulto. under Cover of Js. Madison Esqre. Secy. of State, to whom I forwarded a dispatch from Tunis & transmitted the intelligences I had just collected from Tripoly.
The Brother of Mr. Beaussier at Tripoly having yesterday waited on me, left me the originals of the herein inclosed Copies for my perusal, according to his directions, & I have taken upon myself to Cause said Copies to be drawn up; without his knowledge, being aware their Contents, may be useful, & even acceptable to you, for your own private Governmt. in the affairs respecting Tripoly.—
I beg you, only, to be so kind as to Consider that this letter, & these Copies of originals transmitted to a brother, & to me under the Confidence of Friendship, more so, the Copy of a dispatch from him in his Official Capacity, to his own Minister, are Confided direct by me to you, Sir, not as to the honble. President of the U.S. but as to the best, and the most respectable & Worthy Friend, I am so fortunate, as to have in this world, tho’ at a too far distance! who being at the head of the Government of the U.S., wishes to be informed by disinterested people, of all what may Come to their Knowledge, and may be useful to the prosperity of the Nation, to which you have devoted yourself entirely;—From the above motives I have taken the liberty to address you direct this letter & inclosures, & not to the Secy. of State with whom, alone, I am to Correspond in my Official Capacity, as it would be found indiscreet, & dangerous for Mr. Bier. & me, if such a dispatch to his own Minister, Should be known, or published abroad.—
It is not to me to take a prejudice in favor or against the parties or individuals Concerned in this Affair;—nor to hazard with you my private opinion on a Continuation of a war with Tripoly, a redemption of our unfortunate Captives there, or a peace with that Regency—even on a Continuation of a peace with Tunis & Algiers, or a general war with those Barbarian Powers.—I have not forgotten your opinion while Minister Pleny. near the French Court at Versailles;—that a Coalition between the European Powers at war with them, was preferable to Shameful annual tributes, to be at peace with them.
The United States having fitted out a Navy to protect their Neutrality, to Exerce it & Keep it employed with advantage the War with Tripoly is an useful object; as it forces the Tunisians & Algerins to Keep faithfully their treaties with the U.S.—and in the present Circumstances, a war with these two last Barbarian Powers, Should they declare it, would not be a great addition of Expences, to your Navy; in these Seas. Compensating what it Costs to be at peace with them; the U.S. would give a great Example to the European Powers tributary of the Barbarians, in forcing these Pirates to Peace, without Purchasing it.—
But unfortunately the Crew of the Frigate Philada. is in Captivity at Tripoly! it is impossible to get them free without paying an adequate ransom, treating for a Peace at the Same Time;—It is that unfortunate Chance of Captivity, we Experience, now, which has hitherto risen the pretentions of these powers of Barbary, to which the European Powers have Submited themselves, to be at Peace with them;—the Consuls of the Powers of the 2nd. Order, having Purchased at very heavy rates their Peace & Ransoms (the Swd. for Example) would see, I apprehend, with some Jealousy, that the U. States Should obtain an honble. Peace, & the release of their People in Captivity, at low Terms;—they may then take indirect Means to prevent the Powers at war, to Succeed—add to this the Jealousy of the Britsh. Consul against the French Intervention, there is no wounder, the Dey, Bashaw, & Bey of these Regencies, takes the advantage of the intrigues & Servility of the Christians, who ought to Join together de Bonne foy & follow your example to distroy these Pirates for Ever; Please to excuse my freedom in having entered with you & ventured in these details, but I am fully Confident you will receive them as a proof of my Zeal & Activity for the Service of the U. States, & my readiness to execute your Commands in whatever you may find proper to employ me.
I have the honor to be with the greatest respect, Sir Your most Obedient & Devoted Servant.
Stephen Cathalan Junr.
P.S. What follows is a Copy of a letter from Consul Thoms Appleton dated leghorn 24th July, “I Just received a letter from Commodore Preble, in which he says. under date of Messina 29 of June, I am now in possession of Six Gun and two Mortar boats, Six long battering Cannons—with Powder, Shot & Shells, and all the necessary Naval and Military Stores for an attack on Tripoly which I hope will bring the Bashaw to such terms of Peace as we shall not blush to accept of.” His harbour & Coast is at present Closely Blockaded, I left sight of it the 14 inst. Since which I have visited Tunis, His Tunisian Majesty threatens but I do not believe he will declare War against us, while we have a respectable force in these Seas.”
S. Cn. J:
I ought have wrote my Self this Letter, but I have Such a Bad hand, that I have caused my chancor. Jus. Oliver, to copy, it on the original.
RC (DLC); in a clerk’s hand, with signatures and second postscript by Cathalan; at head of text: “Private”; addressed: “Most Honble. Thomas Jefferson—President of the United States”; endorsed by TJ as received 20 Oct. and so recorded in SJL. Enclosures: (1) Bonaventure Beaussier to Edward Preble, 7 Germinal Year 12 [28 Mch. 1804], from Tripoli, reporting his audience with Yusuf Qaramanli, to whom he communicated the interest of the first consul in the release of the Philadelphia prisoners and in fostering peace between the United States and Tripoli; Beaussier informs Preble that the pasha was pleased to hear about Bonaparte’s interest but surprised that Beaussier had returned from his conference aboard Preble’s ship without a Tripolitan prisoner previously discussed; Beaussier advises Preble that release of the prisoner would facilitate his goal of delivering provisions to the American prisoners; in response to Preble’s question of what the pasha might expect for a ransom, Beaussier answers that given Qaramanli’s desire to combine ransom and peace negotiations and the amounts paid by some European powers, he expects that Tripoli will seek at least 500,000 piastres; Beaussier adds that he did inform the pasha that the United States will not pay for peace and has plans to foment civil war between Qaramanli and his brother, and that he would be wise, given the first consul’s interest, to lower his expectations; but Qaramanli argued that Bonaparte would not expect him to divest himself of the advantages of war and that he had little to fear from his brother; Beaussier advises Preble that sustained aggression will only raise the costs of freeing the American prisoners, and that during negotiations the blockade ought to be lifted; he asks if Preble has full power to negotiate with Tripoli, or if the commodore must wait for the sanction of his government, which could not have foreseen the capture of 300 Americans by Tripoli (Tr in DLC: TJ Papers, 139:24095-6; in French; at head of text: “Copy”; translation printed in , 3:542-4). (2) Beaussier to his brother in Marseilles, 28 Prairial Year 12 [17 June 1804], from Tripoli; briefing his brother on the report he has submitted to the first consul, Beaussier believes that, in accordance with his government’s wishes, he had convinced Yusuf Qaramanli to restore peace between Tripoli and the United States; the actions of Commodore Preble, however, have put an end to negotiations, and Preble has accused Beaussier of compromising the dignity of the French government; upon his return to the blockade on 12 June, Preble responded to Beaussier’s letters of 28 Mch. and 24 May; Beaussier now transcribes the commodore’s letter of the 12th, in which Preble opines that the first consul must have been a bit mortified that Beaussier has been unable to deliver food and clothes to the American prisoners from the Philadelphia, and that Bonaparte must have expected his intervention to carry more weight with Qaramanli; Preble adds that he could certainly send ashore the Tripolitan prisoner the Americans took, but only in exchange for one of the American prisoners; furthermore, Preble declares the pasha’s demand as futile and that he can never expect more than a tenth of the expected ransom; Preble insists that he has been authorized to redeem the Philadelphia prisoners and make peace if this can be accomplished in terms that are compatible with the honor and dignity of the United States; Richard O’Brien carries Preble’s letter and is to present a ransom offer to Qaramanli; Preble hopes that Beaussier will aid O’Brien in the negotiations and that he will also obtain permission to unload provisions for the prisoners; Beaussier next transcribes his 13 June response to Preble, in which he insists he has done nothing to compromise the name of the first consul or his government’s dignity but that the truly paltry and injurious offer of ransom (“l’offre vraiment mesquine et injurieuse”) after such a long break in discussions has disrupted negotiations; Beaussier decries O’Brien’s failure to confer with him before making the ransom offer to Qaramanli and argues that Preble has been wrong in soliciting Bonaparte’s help while intending an offer of only 40,000 piastres, a lower sum than was offered before U.S. sailors were imprisoned; in a postscript of 14 July, Beaussier assumes that Preble has decided to sail for Malta instead of unloading provisions for the prisoners even though the pasha has agreed to allow it; Beaussier next transcribes for his brother his report to the French government on the events of 13 June, describing O’Brien’s impolitic offer to Qaramanli, who nevertheless remained calm and informed O’Brien that Preble could unload the clothing and food for the prisoners and that afterward there would be no further communication between them; Beaussier’s understanding is that Preble must have believed that French intervention would ensure that a meager ransom would be sufficient to free the Philadelphia prisoners, a belief that suggests that Preble has received no instructions from his president, who, informed of the first consul’s interest, would have been more attuned to reason and fairness; Beaussier repeats that Preble seems to have given up on conveying the provisions, despite the urgent need for these essential goods; in a postscript to the report, Beaussier states his belief that while in Malta, Preble consulted with Bryan McDonogh, the British consul, who is a close friend of O’Brien; Beaussier warns that McDonogh is a mean, vindictive man, an enemy of peace who is suspicious above all of France’s intervention and who has sought revenge on Tripoli, France, and the United States through his perfidious counsel and insinuations; Beaussier requests that his brother share this communication with Cathalan (Tr in DLC: TJ Papers, 141:21373-4; in French; Beaussier’s June exchange with Preble, in English, is in , 4:180-1, 184-5).
Brother of Mr. Beaussier: likely André Beaussier, who remained in Marseilles, birthplace of the French commissary general at Tripoli, Bonaventure Beaussier (Anne Mézin, Les consuls de France au siècle des lumières [1715-1792] [Paris, 1997], 132-3).