From James Madison to John Armstrong, 12 August 1814
To John Armstrong
August 12. 1814.
Note to the Secretary of War on letters from him to Brown of July 191—and to Izard of July 27. and August 2.2 with a memorandum of the Secretary on the two last, “that in case the attack on Kingston be rendered impracticable, and that the moment of ascendancy on the Lake Ontario may not be lost, 2000 of Izard’s men may be carried to the west end of the Lake to join Gaines; being landed on the East side of Niagara and marched rapidly to Lewistown and Buffalo. When united, to reduce Forts Gaines3 and Niagara. Izard to command—of the remainder of Izard’s army—2000 to begin to fortify on the St. Laurence—the balance, 500, to releive militia at Sackets harbor, and assist in manning the armed barges.” J. A.
It becomes more and more evident that without a direct and constant correspondence and understanding, of which no proof is seen, between Izard, Brown, and the Commanding officer at Sackets-harbor, (as well as between them and the naval Commander) no system of operations can take place. Communications from Buffaloe, to Plattsburg or the St. Laurence and vice versa thro’ Washington with particular instructions founded thereon must be inadequate; the more so as the plans and movements on the lines, must depend on the varying strength and movements of the Enemy, which will be known there before they reach Washington; and as the instructions may become inapplicable before they arrive.
Will not Izard be too late on the St. Laurence to prevent the transportation of troops & stores from Montreal, and consequently the 2000 men be now misapplied in establishing a post for that purpose?
If he is to proceed with 2000 to the head of Lake Ontario ought not communications thereon to be immediately had with the Navy Department: and the measure to be conditioned on the safety of Sackets-harbor?
What arrangements exist for Militia aid from Vermont or New York for the security of the posts on Lake Champlain in case re-inforcements should enable the enemy to direct attacks there as well as elsewhere in the absense of the force with Izard?
James Madison.
Tr (DLC, series 3).
1. In the letter, Armstrong congratulated Maj. Gen. Jacob Brown on his victory in the Battle of Chippawa (for the battle, see 7:546 n. 3) and observed that the further outcome of Brown’s campaign would depend on whether or not Capt. Isaac Chauncey was able to gain control of Lake Ontario. If so, Armstrong wrote, Brown and Col. George Croghan could establish American control of Upper Canada west of York and Gloucester Bay while “menacing Kingston &c. to the East.” If not, Brown would have to return to Fort Erie, and Armstrong recommended that he prepare for this possibility by building bridges to facilitate his retreat. Predicting that the British would then reinforce Fort George by way of Burlington Bay and be in a position to make a surprise attack on Brown’s army, Armstrong suggested that Brown prevent this by “getting possession of [Burlington] heights, & establishing thereon a post” from which to observe and threaten the enemy (DNA: RG 107, LSMA; filed after 30 July 1814).
2. On 27 July 1814, Armstrong suggested that Maj. Gen. George Izard, then at Lake Champlain, move his army west to Ogdensburg and threaten or attack Prescott. If Chauncey drove the British fleet into Kingston harbor, he wrote, Izard could then join forces with Brig. Gen. Edmund Pendleton Gaines to capture the town. On 2 Aug., enclosing a report of severe U.S. losses at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane and a copy of his 27 July letter, Armstrong ordered Izard to move west immediately. The War Department letterbook (DNA: RG 107, LSMA) contains no copy of either letter, and Izard claimed that he had not received the original of 27 July (Izard, Official Correspondence with the Department of War [ 37938], 61–65).