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To James Madison from James Monroe and William Pinkney, 11 September 1806

From James Monroe and William Pinkney

No. 5.
Duplicate.

London September 11. 1806.

Sir,

Our first meeting with Lord Holland and Lord Auckland took place in Downing Street on the 22. of August.* After the usual exchange of powers we stated at their request the objects of our mission, and the general nature of the stipulations by which we expected them to be provided for. They took minutes of what was said by us for the purpose of making their report to the Cabinet, & threw out some observations, but of a very loose and inconclusive character, upon several branches of the subject. They resisted with great earnestness and decision, as an impracticable Subject, the claim of indemnity which we pressed as standing upon unquestionable grounds of justice. They appeared to consider the subject of impressment as extremely delicate and embarrassing, and that of our trade with the colonies of their enemies as presenting important tho’ not equal difficulties; and Lord Auckland expressed a Strong desire, which of course we discouraged, that the former should be suffered to rest upon mere understanding and find no place in the projected Treaty. The best dispositions were, however, professed to arrange every thing upon fair and amicable principles, and nothing was suggested to impair the hope that the result of our negotiation would be entirely satisfactory. We were told at parting that an early day would be mentioned for renewing our conferences.

On the 28th we met them again upon their own appointment.1 We were then told that the purpose of this interview was to obtain from us an explanation of our views with reference to Some of the points upon which we had touched at the former meeting. We were accordingly asked to state precisely what equivalent stipulation, for restoring British Seamen leaving their Service, we would be disposed to insert in the article relative to impressment. Having ascertained that it was vain to expect their consent to an arrangement on this interesting topic in which some Such provision was not an ingredient, we gave them at length a project upon this point, extracted from Mr. Monroe’s instructions of 1804,2 requesting them, however, to receive it as perfectly extra-official, and combining it, as you will perceive, with the provisions in their most advantageous form, for which it was required as the equivalent. A copy of this paper3 is among the enclosures. We presumed that this course, while it hazarded nothing, would at least promote dispatch, and that the air of frankness which belonged to it would be likely to influence advantageously the temper and character of our discussions upon this and every other question before us.

We were also asked to explain the footing upon which we desired to place the commercial intercourse between the United States and the British European dominions. This we did by intimating, as we had done at the former meeting, that the footing of the most favored nation4 was in a general view, the most natural. Their enquiries however, looked to Some precise and equal arrangement of tonnage and imposts, and the countervailing power in the Treaty of 1794 was slightly mentioned.5 Without encouraging at this time any discussion on this point, which they did not seem to be prepared or inclined to enter into, we thought it proper to suggest for their consideration the expedient of a mutual abolition of alien Duties.

On the impressment subject it was soon apparent that they felt the strongest repugnance to a formal renunciation or abandonment of their claim to take from our vessels on the high seas Such Seamen as should appear to be their own Subjects; and they pressed upon us with much Zeal, as a substitute for Such an abandonment, a provision that the persons composing the crews of our ships should be furnished with authentic documents of citizenship, the nature and form of which should be settled by Treaty; that these documents should completely protect those to whom they related; but that, subject to such protections, the Ships of war of Great Britain should continue to visit and impress on the main ocean as heretofore.

They enforced their preference for this sort of arrangement, in a desultory conversation, by observing that they supposed the object of our plan, to be to prevent the impressment at sea of American seamen, and not to withdraw British seamen from the naval Service of their country, in times of great national peril; for the purpose of employing them ourselves; that the first of these purposes would be effectually accomplished by a system which should introduce and establish a clear and Conclusive distinction between the seamen of the two countries, which on all occasions would be implicitly respected; that if they should consent to make our commercial navy a floating asylum for all the British seamen who, tempted by higher wages, should quit their service for ours, the effect of such a concession upon their maritime strength on which Great Britain depended, not only for her prosperity but her safety, might be fatal; that in the most alarming emergency they might thus be deprived, to an extent which it was impossible to calculate, but which could not fail to be great, of their only means of security; that our vessels might become receptacles for deserters to any amount, even from their military Marine, in the ports of neutral states, and when once at sea, might Set at defiance the just claims of the service to which Such deserters belonged; that even within the United States it could not be expected that any plan for recovering British deserters could be efficacious, and that moreover the plan we proposed was inadequate, in its range and object, inasmuch as it was merely prospective, confined wholly to deserters, and in no respect providing for the case of the vast body of British Seamen now employed in our trade to every part of the world. To this it was replied, that one of the suppositions on which much reliance had been placed was that of an extreme case which was barely possible in fact, and which, if it should happen at all, and redress should not be afforded by the interference of the neutral power in whose port the unlawful refuge should be attempted, could not be considered as within the spirit of Such a provision as we had Suggested; that another of these Suppositions ascribed undue importance to the resource in question, which, while it severely oppress’d and irritated their friends, could add little to the effective strength of their Navy; that the number of men thus violently taken from our vessels, if American citizens should be deducted, had always been comparatively small; that if G. Britain should now be admitted (as intended by the plan) to the benefit of our domestic regulations for apprehending and Securing within our country, future deserters from her merchant and other vessels, the number to which Such a resource could apply must hereafter be considerably less and in time be wholly insignificant; that it would be in their own power to prevent us, by Suitable regulations, from carrying their seamen from their own ports, and would become our duty to assist in restoring them when they Should desert and be found within our jurisdiction; that there was every reason to believe that this assistance would be as effectual as it was Known to be in the case of our own seamen deserting from our own vessels; for that, even if it Should be admitted that a motive might now be imagined of sufficient power to induce the people of the United States to give shelter and protection to deserting British seamen, it was obvious that this motive arose out of the claim and practice on the part of Great Britain which it was now proposed to renounce, and would Cease with them; that there would, moreover, be open to this country the fair and reasonable exercise of the right of regaining her own seamen within her own jurisdiction, as opportunity occurred, in whatsoever vessels they Should be found; that impressment upon the high Seas, by those to whom that Service is necessarily confided, must under any conceivable guards be frequently abused, and in its best form cannot fail to generate private animosity and national resentment and of course to endanger the friendly relations of the two countries; that if it were for no other cause we should See with deep regret the power of impressment at sea under any modifications, however plausible, insisted upon; but that it was, besides, impossible that we should acknowledge in favor of any foreign power the claim to Such a jurisdiction on board our vessels found upon the main ocean as this sort of impressment implied, a claim as plainly inadmissible in its principle, and derogatory from the unquestionable rights of our sovereignty, as it was vexatious in its practical consequences.

Upon the commercial Subject we collected that the East India trade would not be likely to give much trouble; but that an open trade to the British West-Indies will be obtained, if at all, with great difficulty. Lord Auckland expressed an opinion that there Should be restriction upon the tonnage as in the 12th. art. of the Treaty of 1794,6 which we told him at once could never be assented to, and Lord Holland Spoke of a duty to be imposed by our Government upon importations from their Islands which should be of sufficient amount to check the exportation, of the articles so imported, to Europe. His idea was, of course, that no part of this duty should be remitted as a Drawback, and he wished to comprehend in this plan our importations from Enemy colonies, without which it could have no other effect than to force the imports from the British colonies into our internal consumption, and leave the imports from enemy colonies for exportation. We thought it proper to oppose ourselves in a particular manner to the last mentioned application of this plan, and it was not persisted in.

The trade with enemies colonies was still viewed as an embarrassing Subject, and continuous voyages, even between neutral European ports and these colonies, were strongly protested against. It appeared to be certain, however, that our opponents would finally agree that the continuity of the voyages should in all cases7 be held to be broken by the landing of the cargoes in the United States and perhaps also the paying or Securing the duties, as heretofore practised. We did not bring into view at this time the distinction which we mean hereafter to urge in favor of our commerce with the East Indian colonies of the other parties to the war.

In the course of this conference Lord Auckland renewed a proposal which he had glanced at in our first interview, that the Treaty of 1794 Should be made the basis of the present negotiation. This was rejected in Such a manner as to obtain for the rejection his entire acquiescence. His Lordship towards the close of the meeting enquired if Congress had not at their last Session passed Some law affecting their commercial relations with Great Britain. We had been restrained from calling their attention to the act prohibiting &c.8 by the apprehension that, as they could not be supposed to be ignorant of it, we might be thought, by pressing it officiously and ostentatiously into notice, to wish to make use of it as a menace; but we now took occasion to explain, in as conciliatory a manner as was consistent with the complete justification of the Law, its origin and character. They requested us to give them a copy of the act, and we Sent it accordingly the next day.

On the 4th instant at night we received from the British commissrs. a Note upon the Subject of the act of Congress, of which a copy is enclosed.9 It appeared to us that it would be prudent to found upon this Note a request of an immediate interview, in the course of which it might perhaps be practicable to avail ourselves of their anxiety, that a suspension of the act should be pressed upon our government, to advance our negotiation with reference at least to the most interesting of the topics involved in it. To our note, desiring an interview, Lord Holland replied that he would be glad to see us on the   10 but that Lord Auckland being out of town, would not probably be able to attend. Lord Auckland did not in fact, and we believe could not, attend. We opened the conference with Lord Holland by observing that we had been withheld by considerations which he would easily comprehend, from being the first to mention the act of the American government which formed the subject of their note, but that it had been constantly present to our minds as making it peculiarly desireable that we should understand one another as soon as possible, upon Some, if not all, of the points in discussion between us, and as presenting the prospect of a dilemma, as the period prescribed for its commencement approached without finding us forward in our negotiation. After a short vindication of the act, in the course of which we did not omit to represent it in connection with the special mission which grew out of it as manifesting the friendly sentiments and views of our government towards that of his Majesty, we observed, that relying upon the dispositions which their Lordships had constantly avowed and by which they were evidently animated, to establish between the two countries by a suitable adjustment of all Subsisting differences the most perfect and lasting harmony, it was our earnest desire to take some effectual step which Should Save the honor of both governments, for ensuring the Suspension which their Lordships had recommended; that there might be reason to apprehend that, unless some advantageous change should appear to have taken place in the State of things which in the opinion of Congress required the adoption of the measure in question, it would not easily be abandoned even for a time; that no Such change had taken place, for that all the Subjects of complaint which had excited the sensibility of Congress at their last Session and led to the passage of this act, were still as much at large as ever; that it was indeed true that Commissioners in the highest degree acceptable had been appointed by his Majesty’s government to treat with us, and that the spirit of justice & amity displayed by their Lordships promised the happiest results, but that it was also true that up to this period it could only be Said, as might equally be Said of the period when this act was finally past, that negotiations were depending; that we were therefore extremely anxious, when we Should transmit their Lordships Note to the United States, to be enabled to accompany it with assurances that, altho’ much remained to be done, the two Subjects of impressment and trade with enemies colonies would certainly be adjusted to the satisfaction of our government.

Lord Holland told us in reply that we were aware that the first of these Subjects was full of difficulty, and required that the feelings and opinions of many persons should be managed and consulted; that it touched the most delicate and momentuous of their national concerns and called for much enquiry and deliberation; that he hoped it would Soon be practicable (and we might be confident that there should be no unreasonable delay) to Submit to us a plan to which both sides might without reluctance consent; that in the mean time we could state to our government, what was unquestionably true, that those with whom we were treating were diligently and anxiously employed in endeavors to devise an arrangement which should be convenient and honorable to us, and at the same time free from improper hazard to Great Britain; that it appeared to him that the actual pendency of the negotiations here (unless their Sincerity were distrusted, as he was sure it would not be) would furnish an adequate motive to Congress for merely postponing the commencement of a Law which was originally a very strong measure and would certainly if allowed to go into operation at a moment when Great Britain was affording in the face of the world an unequivocal demonstration of her wish to remove every ground of misunderstanding between us, acquire a character of extreme harshness; that it was greatly to be lamented that the discussions in which we were now engaged had not been sooner begun, but that Knowing as we did, to what cause the delay was to be ascribed, we Knew also that it was unavoidable. His Lordship mingled with these observations the most amicable assurances, and took an occasion which a remark from one of us presented, to express his Conviction that the event of a peace between G. Britain and France would be so far from creating any indisposition or producing any obstacles on the part of this Country to a liberal adjustment with us, that it would rather facilitate that adjustment, by removing from some of the topics the peculiar interest and difficulty which the present crisis imparts to them.

After some further efforts on our part to promote the object of this interview, without departing from that tone of Conciliation which prudence as well as inclination recommended, we separated, and soon afterwards we prepared and sent to the British Commissioners an answer to their Note of the 4th. of which you will find a copy enclosed.11

To these details we take the liberty to add our opinion, formed upon a careful view of the whole Subject, that it will be proper, upon the meeting of Congress in December, to Suspend the act for prohibiting the importation of certain articles of British manufacture, so as to afford further time for the completion of the negotiations which it evidently presumes and which are now in train.

The ground which Congress have taken in this just and salutary measure we are far from wishing to abandon; but to suspend and to abandon it are very different things. The last would wound deeply the honor of the nation and prostrate the character of the government; but the first is in perfect conformity with the spirit and purpose of the Law, and while it would furnish a signal proof of the equity and moderation of our public councils, would preserve unimpaired that firm and dignified attitude which it becomes us at all times, but now especially, to maintain. The Suspension will be so far from relinquishing the measure, or weakening its effect, that it will distinctly imply a re-assertion of its principle and policy, and an unshaken resolution to act upon and enforce it, as soon as negotiation Shall have been Sufficiently and unsuccessfully tried.

The death of Mr. Fox which every hour is expected to announce may and probably will retard our progress for some time; but our hopes are strong that we Shall finally and without much further delay accomplish the great objects confided to us. The temper which the British Commissioners have obviously brought to the negotiation, corresponding with that which has been manifested towards the mission by those who hold official stations here, as well as by the public in general, is as friendly and respectful to our government and country as could be desired. We shall continue our exertions to fulfill with all possible dispatch the instructions with which we have been honored, and shall communicate to you by the earliest opportunity whatever of importance shall occur. We have the honor to be with great consideration and esteem, Sir, Your most obedient servants

Jas. Monroe
Wm. Pinkney

P.S. Sepr. 12. We have just received Separate notes to the same effect from Lord Auckland of which copies are enclosed.12 They authorise us to expect that the conference of Wednesday next, to which he invites us, will enable us to give you details of a more precise and interesting nature than it has been practicable to give in the letter to which this is a postscript.

We omitted to mention in this letter that we have been assured by the British Commissioners13 (particularly by Lord Holland) that a liberal and Satisfactory article, relative to the extent of our jurisdiction over the waters near our own coast, and the exemption of the defined limits from all the operations of war, will be cheerfully agreed to, and that an article for defining Blockade will meet with no opposition.

Sepr 13. The last account of Mr. Fox’s health of this morning is, that the symptoms have encreased to So alarming a degree, that he is not expected to Survive many hours.14

RC, two copies, and enclosures, two copies (DNA: RG 46, Executive Proceedings, Foreign Relations, 10B-B1; and DNA: RG 233, President’s Messages, 10A-D1); FC (MB). Both RCs in a clerk’s hand, signed by Monroe and Pinkney; docketed by Wagner. FC in Pinkney’s hand, with his headnote: “The original sent by the British packet to Halifax—sent to Sr. F. Vincent the 13th. of Septr—Packet sailed the 23d.—Duplicate sent by the Eaton to Boston—sailed from Deal the 23d.” For enclosures (printed in ASP description begins American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States […] (38 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1832–61). description ends , Foreign Relations, 3:135–37), see nn. 1, 3, and 9–12.

1Monroe and Pinkney enclosed copies of the correspondence arranging this meeting (1 p.).

2JM to Monroe, 5 Jan. 1804, PJM-SS description begins Robert J. Brugger et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series (12 vols. to date; Charlottesville, Va., 1986–). description ends 6:282–306.

3FC has “project.” The enclosure (2 pp.) repeated nearly verbatim, in two articles, the administration’s preferred versions of the first, second, and eighth articles of the proposed treaty included in JM’s 5 Jan. 1805 instructions to Monroe (see note 2 above). Monroe and Pinkney added a paragraph providing that when any person’s nationality came into question “within the dominions of either power,” government-issued identity documents would be accepted as valid, court-approved standards of evidence would be applied in cases where such documents were not available, and both governments would take measures to ensure the validity of identity papers granted under their authority.

4Second RC adds “extended to all the European dominions of His Majesty” here.

5Second RC has “Mr. Jay’s treaty.” Monroe and Pinkney referred to article 15 of the Jay treaty, which specifically reserved Great Britain’s right to impose duties on U.S. ships equivalent to those paid by British ships in American ports (Miller, Treaties description begins Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (8 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1930–48). description ends , 2:257).

6Article 12 of the Jay treaty limited U.S. ships trading in the British West Indies to a cargo capacity of seventy tons (ibid., 254).

7Second RC omits “in all cases.”

8For the act, see JM to Monroe, 20 Mar. 1806, PJM-SS description begins Robert J. Brugger et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series (12 vols. to date; Charlottesville, Va., 1986–). description ends 11:410–11 and n. 1.

9Holland and Auckland’s 4 Sept. 1806 note (1 p.) acknowledged receipt of the copy of the nonimportation act and requested that Monroe and Pinkney recommend that its implementation be delayed, pointing out that if the act went into effect, Parliament would likely retaliate, creating “mutual irritation” and “fresh impediments” to the treaty negotiations.

10Left blank by the clerk; FC has “6th.” Monroe and Pinkney enclosed copies of the correspondence arranging this meeting (1 p.).

11The enclosed copy of Monroe and Pinkney’s 10 Sept. reply to Holland and Auckland (3 pp.) stated that the U.S. government did not wish “to oppose any obstacle to a fair and satisfactory conclusion of the present negotiation”; that the nonimportation act was the result of “causes of a very imperious nature,” further discussion of which could “serve only to produce regret”; and that the U.S. commissioners would inform their government of the “friendly disposition” of their British counterparts, otherwise doing all in their power to promote the success of the negotiation.

12Auckland’s 12 Sept. 1806 note to Monroe (2 pp.) stated that he had not seen Holland since returning to London owing to “unhappy Considerations” (the mortal illness of Charles James Fox, Holland’s uncle, patron, and former guardian), but that Holland had written him to request that he assure Monroe and Pinkney that the negotiation was not being neglected. Auckland asked the U.S. commissioners to meet him on 17 Sept. 1806 to discuss “many particulars” in preparation for their next official conference. Also enclosed was a copy of Monroe’s 14 Sept. 1806 note to Auckland (2 pp.) accepting the invitation and stating that Holland should not feel “the least anxiety” about missing the meeting.

13FC has “Ministers.”

14In the second RC, the preceding paragraph reads as follows: “Sepr. 13. The account of Mr. Fox’s health of this morning is that the unfavorable Symptoms have returned to so alarming a degree as to leave no hope that he can long Survive.” FC has “PS. Sept. 13th. The account of Mr. Fox’s Health of this Morning is &c (as in the Newspapers).”

Authorial notes

[The following note(s) appeared in the margins or otherwise outside the text flow in the original source, and have been moved here for purposes of the digital edition.]

º This Date is erroneous; the first meeting took place on the 27th.

º This date is also erroneous; the meeting took place on the 1st. of September.

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