To John Adams from John Brown Cutting, 3 June 1790
From John Brown Cutting
London June 3d 1790
Dear Sir
I inclosed You a few days ago a parcel of printed papers some of which I conceived might contain interesting intelligence especially if the dispute between Britain & Spain shoud terminate in hostilities, as in such an event the government of the United States woud at least be involved in discussions of considerable importance to our country with one or both of those nations.
Among the rest you have an authentic copy of the memorial or narrative of Mr Mears on the seisure of the british vessels in Nootka sound—as also a sketch of the debate in parliament occasion’d by the message of his britannic majesty on that affair.1 You will not however obtain from the sketch an adequate conception of the high tone in which the minister spoke. It was thoroughly understood on all sides of the house—(I speak this from having been an auditor) that in unanimously promising his majesty national support against the insult of Spain the minister on his part was pledged to obtain not only pecuniary reparation for the confiscated property and for the insult offered to the british flag, but also a full dereliction from the Court of Spain of its claim to exclusive sovereignty over the coasts in the vicinity of Nootka Sound and on the northwest coasts of America and of exclusive navigation and commerce in those seas. A categorical answer to a demand of this sort is pretended by the Court of London to be expected from Madrid by the return of a messenger sent with it just four weeks ago. Meanwhile the warlike preparations in every port and corner of the Island are most vigourous and extensive. Ever since the summer of 1787 Spain has been putting her fleets in the most formidable condition.— Nor can one believe that the mere menace of Britain will make her under such circumstances yield the point in contest. In such a crisis it was natural for both nations to turn their eyes on France with considerable anxiety. The late discussion and determination in her national assembly of the great constitutional question whether the power of declaring war shou’d be lodged with the Legislature or be confided to the Executive was doubtless hasten’d by this anxiety. The settlement of this point in favour of the Legislative body is conceived by many here as decisive that the french nation will take no part in a war between Spain and Britain. But a more erroneous conclusion never was made. The military spirit of the nation is more alive than ever—and if a majority of its representatives shou’d after public discussion and debate decree to go to war, it wou’d be carried on with more vigour than ever. A partial sale of the ecclesiastical remains for a paper currency has opend a resource of finance that in case of state necessity might be vastly amplified.2 And as to the supposed hazard that Spain might interfere to attempt a counter-revolution in France the idea is already scouted by the partizans of the reform. Two points only are wanting to produce a decree of the french national assembly for war. 1. A persuasion that the spanish have justice on their side in the present quarrel. and 2dly: That it is for the interest of the french that the mines of South America shoud not become british property. I expect to see both positions established by fact and argument shoud Britain manifestly overstep the limits of equity in her claims. In the interim the naval preparations in the ports of France will keep pace with those in the ports of Britain.
From the moment that a spanish war was publicly known to be impending—the people of the United States began to rise in the estimation of all ranks of men here. Instead of being considered as heretofore a sort of republican banditti enemies to kings and good order on land, and on the ocean one grade above the algerines only—in the course of a very few days we became popular in the City and bearable I am told even in the Cabinet!3 The unkind behaviour of Capt Hendricks an american navigator at Nootka sound—in not quarreling with the spanish Commodore was overlooked:4 and the leading Editors of the ministerial newspapers have now orders to affirm that the offer of a treaty offensive and defensive between Britain and America is already dispatchd across the atlantic.5 The principal inducements to an acceptance of such a treaty on the part of Congress—is a guarantee of a free navigation of the river Missisippi—a participation of some farther indulgencies as to the west india traffic—an adjustment of all disputed boundaries and a speedy surrender of the posts.
I wish the present juncture cou’d be improved for the adjustment of some criterion whereby our seamen might be discriminated from british seamen and consequently exempted from the outrages of the british press gangs. The great point to be guarded against on our part is—the first violence of having our mariners forced from on board our
ships under a pretext that they are britons.— To do away all colour for committing it some palpable species of prima facie evidence is wanted—such as being immediately produced might stare every officer of a press gang in the face and leave him without excuse if he ventured to depart from the orders of the Admiralty Board by which he is ever directed to take no foreigners. A few days after I had memorializ’d the Lords of the Admiralty and almost exacted by dint of diligent and remonstrating assiduity the liberation of those six crews, or parts of crews which had been impress’d, Mr Governeur Morris to whom I had communicated my toils and their termination sent a note to the duke of Leeds and asking for an hours conversation with him—stated verry forcibly to him the pernicious effect that impressing our mariners must have on the commerce of Britain.6 The Duke listen’d to him, thanked him, seemed to believe him and said orders shou’d be issued and measures taken to prevent the american seamen from being impress’d in future. But there are real difficulties in the business that general commands of this nature do not meet. As a zealous citizen I do wish some effectual remedy to such a national mischief and indignity coud be devised. No moment can be more favourable for attempting something of the sort than the present. The perfect protection of our mariners from being impressed or impeded is just now a desirable object to the commercial part of this nation. In former wars when the british seamen were press’d to mann the navy—the merchants coud generally procure Swedes Hollanders and other european seamen to supply their places—but at present all those foreign seamen are engaged by their sovereigns in war or by their fellow subjects—and the british merchant will be compeld to resort to the United States for american seamen in lieu of them.
As I send this letter one post later than that by which the mail is conveyed to Falmouth—it is necessary for me to close it immediately to obtain the chance of its reaching Mr Rutledge at Falmouth.
I intreat Mrs Adams to accept with yourself the best compliments and sincere good wishes of / Your respectful affectionate / and most obedt sert:
John Brown Cutting
RC (Adams Papers); endorsed by CA: “J B Cutting”; notation by CFA: “J. B. Cutting / June 3d 1790.”
1. For John Meares, see Descriptive List of Illustrations, No. 6, above. In 1789 Spanish officers, acting in the name of King Carlos IV of Spain, seized Meares’ ships and his trading post at Canada’s Nootka Sound for “good and lawful prize.” Meares took it as a private loss of profit and, more significantly, as a public humiliation of the British flag. In April 1790 he brought his grievances to London, where he won powerful supporters who readied for war. George III addressed Parliament on 5 May, denouncing Spain’s exclusive rights to the Pacific Coast. William Pitt gave an “animated” speech of support the next day. M.P.’s unanimously approved outfitting forty ships of the line. Cutting enclosed Meares’ 30 April account of the affair, titled Authentic Copy of the Memorial to the Right Honourable William Wyndham Grenville . . . Containing Every Particular Respecting the Capture of the Vessels in Nootka Sound, London, 1790.
When Meares traveled to London to press the House of Commons for military reprisal and personal compensation, the Nootka Sound conflict erupted into a full-blown international incident. Over the following months, the crisis laid bare the unequal strength of two major European pacts: the Family Compact, last renewed in 1761, which committed France to aid Spain; and the 1788 Triple Alliance of Britain, the Netherlands, and Prussia. While the Dutch Navy swept to Britain’s side, Spain had a tougher time persuading France to uphold their agreement. In the first major foreign-policy decision of the new French National Assembly, lawmakers resolved to abstain from all wars of conquest. Following some diplomatic pressure, France relented slightly. It outfitted fourteen ships of the line in a show of solidarity with Spain and offered to mediate the dispute. Diplomatic efforts continued apace, with British and Spanish negotiators meeting at Madrid in mid-summer to craft an agreement (vol. 19:309; London World, 6, 7 May 1790; , p. 233–246).
2. The French National Assembly voted on 2 Nov. 1789 to seize ecclesiastical property as partial payment for the national debt, and on 19 Dec. it began auctioning off 400 million livres’ worth of land. Turning its focus to foreign affairs, the assembly took the dramatic step, on 22 May 1790, of renouncing war for military conquest. This was a critical shift of policy, for if the Nootka Sound conflict triggered an Anglo-Spanish war, then France would be expected to uphold the Family Compact and aid Spain in safeguarding its colonial possessions in South America (, p. xviii, 145; , p. 487; , p. 237).
3. In Oct. 1789 George Washington dispatched Gouverneur Morris to London to resolve some of the issues lingering from JA’s ministerial tenure, namely, the ongoing impressment of American seamen and the British Army’s refusal to evacuate the frontier posts. The president instructed Morris, acting as an unofficial envoy, to renew negotiations for an Anglo-American commercial treaty and to raise the possibility of exchanging ministers. Morris met with the Marquis of Carmarthen and Pitt several times throughout the spring, but he made no headway on any front. At the same time, Morris convened with the French foreign ministry in London and he socialized with Pitt’s rival Charles James Fox, factors that hindered prospects of diplomatic success. Reporting to Washington on 29 May 1790, Morris wrote: “It now stands on such Ground that they must write a Letter making the first Advance . . . and to that Effect I warned them against sending a Message by one of their Consuls” (, 4:179–181; 5:322–323, 430–438).
4. Capt. John Kendrick (ca. 1740–1794) commanded the 1787–1789 expeditions of the Columbia Rediviva and Lady Washington to China. Kendrick was at Nootka Sound when Meares’ ships were seized, and Meares claimed that Kendrick supported the action (vol. 19:xiii; , 9:91; London Public Advertiser, 22 May 1790).
5. As the Nootka Sound conflict heightened, the British press speculated that if the United States signed an offensive and defensive treaty with Britain, then Britain would intervene with Spain to guarantee American navigation of the Mississippi River (London Whitehall Evening Post, 1–3 June; London Public Advertiser, 3 June).
6. For Cutting’s efforts to counter the British Navy’s impressment of American sailors, see his letter of 5 July, and note 5, below.