1. The dispatches, dated 9 July, were from Lafayette to Lieutenant General Rochambeau, commander of the French expeditionary corps, and to Rear Admiral Ternay, commander of the expeditionary fleet. Both documents presumably contained the same content; each was addressed to both Rochambeau and Ternay. The dispatches set out GW’s initial recommendations for joint operations. Lafayette wrote: “New York is in any case and under all assumptions an objective preferable to any other. That city is the pivot on which turn all of the enemy’s operations in America and any hopes the king of England may still retain. Its central and maritime position makes it extremely dangerous to the United States. It shelters all of the Tory refugees and sustains those who remain among us. The conquest of this place and the adjacent islands would make us masters of an excellent army, stores, and the better part of England’s resources on this continent. It would, by the capture not only of armed ships but of transports, sailors, etc., strike a very deadly blow to the English navy. In a word, gentlemen, it is clear that the New York expedition is the most glorious one, the one most advantageous to France and America, the one that both nations most desire, and in a certain conjuncture it may be the only practicable one. It decides the independence of the United States and puts us in a position to undertake anything. … General Washington proposes to you the following plan, on which he wishes you, gentlemen, to act according to your own judgment. … he would like you to enter inside the Hook immediately with your fleet and your army and to send to Rhode Island only the sick, the stores, and, in a word, whatever would encumber you in the campaign. … General Washington does not want to decide on any plan of attack against New York before he has asked your opinion, gentlemen, but it appears that we could make a junction of French and American troops on Long Island for the capture of Brooklyn, which is the key to the city of New York. He thinks we should attack from that direction and notes with pleasure that this plan approximates the one proposed by the French ministry. … If the fleet should arrive at Rhode Island, however, General Washington is of the opinion that it would be better to put the army ashore at New London, from which it would join us either by land or by sea, according to circumstances. … In any case, gentlemen, General Washington thinks it will be enormously useful to have at New London three or four, or at least two, French frigates to cruise in the Sound. … General Washington hopes, gentlemen, that you would be willing to send to New London, under convoy of these frigates, the clothing, arms, and ammunition that you are bringing for the United States, which are becoming very necessary to us. You will find a person in that town responsible for receiving them and seeing that they reach us.”

“There you have, gentlemen, what General Washington instructed me to add to my previous letters. He thinks that these proposals will be presented to you in clearer fashion in French. While requesting you to consult your own opinion in deciding whether to follow these ideas, he thinks that if we can maintain our superiority in New York Harbor, we shall have every reason to flatter ourselves that we shall succeed in this important enterprise, and that this flattery is completely justified by the probability of success on which we have every reason to count. … I have the honor to write to you this letter in triplicate so that it may reach you at any one of the stations where you are expected, Cape Henry [Va.], Black Point [N.J.], and Rhode Island” (Lafayette Papers description begins Stanley J. Idzerda et al., eds. Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution: Selected Letters and Papers, 1776–1790. 5 vols. Ithaca, N.Y., 1977-83. description ends , 3:69–76).

2. This enclosure has not been identified.