To John Jay from the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Robert R. Livingston), 4 January 1783
From the Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Robert R. Livingston)
Philadelphia 4th. Jany 1783
Dear Sir
I have before me your dispatches of the 4th. & 18 Sepr last, & the 13th. of October.1 It gives me much uneasiness to find by them that your health is not yet confirmed particularly as the extreem shortness of your Letters compared with the importance of the matter, give me reason to fear that it has suffered more than you would have us believe— I am under some anxiety relative to the fate of your letter of the 18th. Sepr as only the duplicate copy has arrived, & I find by that you have risked it without a cypher. Should it get into improper hands it might be attended with disagreeable consequences— It is of so much importance that both you & we should judge rightly of the designs of the court to whom we have intrusted such extensive powers—2 that I most earnestly wish you had enlarged on the reasons which have induced you to form the opinion you intimate—an opinion which if well founded, must render your negotiations extreamly painful, & the issue of them very uncertain— If on the other hand it should have been taken up too hastily, it is to be feared that in defiance of all that prudence & self-possession for3 which you are happily distinguished it will someti4 discover itself in a reserve & want of confidence which may afford hopes to our artful antagonist of exciting jealousies between us & our friends.5 I so sincerely wish that your conjectures on this head may not be well founded, that I am led to hope you carry your suspicions too far & the more so as Dr. Franklin to whom I dare say you have communicated them freely does not as you say agree in sentiment with you.6 But I pretend not to judge7, since I have not the advantage of seeing from the same ground. Perhaps some light may be thrown upon the subject by such facts as I have been able to collect here, & with which it is impossible you should be acquainted—8 The policy you suppose to influence the measures of France can only be founded in a distrust which I persuade myself she can hardly entertain of those who have put their dearest interest in her hands— She is too well informed of the State of this country to believe there is the least reason to suppose that we could have the most distant Idea of a separate peace—if such distrust realy exists, it would in my opinion dictate them to let G:B. [Great Britain] acknowledge our independence at once, rather than make it the obbject of subsequent negotiations.9 When satisfied on that point we can with more advantage contend for those our allies have at heart— Whereas by witholding it & making it the price of concessions on
the part of France which she may not chuse to make an opportunity would be afforded to embroil & incline us to listen to separate proposals—10 Upon this principle France seems to have acted in all the answers which she has hither to given as well to the direct proposals of great Britain as to those made by the imperial Courts.11 When Mr Grenville proposed to treat of the independence of the United States with his M.C.M. [Most Christian Majesty] provided that an opportunity was afforded to take the lead in the negotiations, & to suspend that part of it— Yet we find the reply of the court of Versailles led to a direct negotiation between Great Britain & us, & ended in the offer of an conditional independence—the reply of the Court of France to that of London communicated to Mr. Grenville on the 21st of June speakes the same Language.12
From these & the following facts you will, when you have compared them with those within your own knowledge, draw your inferences with more judgment than I can pretend to do without those you possess— Before your Letters were received the Chevalier DeLaluzerne shewed me a Letter from the Count De Vergennes of the 14th. of August, in which he speakes of Mr. Grenville’s commission & the ground it gave him to hope that negotiations would open wth. an express & unconditional acknowledgment of independence. He mentions the change in the british Administration, their assurances that it should occasion no alteration in the plan of their negotiation—and concludes by expressing his surprize at the alteration which afterwards took place in this essential article in the propositions offered by Mr. Fitzherbert— And infers from thence, that Lord Shelburne had no other design than to divide & deceive.13 In a Letter of Sep the 7th he mentions Mr. Oswalds commission your objections to it14 & his doubts of the manner in which these objections will be received. “If says he Mr Oswald is right in his conjecture that they will be favourably recd and removed then everything is said. If the[n] they reject them because they will not begin where they propose to end, I conceive the negotiation should still go on. We may judge of the intentions of the court of London by their first propositions, if they have independence for their basis we may proceed if not we must break off .”15 In his Letter of the 14th. Octr he mentions with great apparent satisfaction the alterations in Mr. Oswald’s commission.16 From the general tenor of these Letters I can discover nothing but an anxious desire for peace, which might very naturally lead him to wish that objections which he did not concieve essential in the first instance, after having declared to great Britain that no peace could be made till our independence was acknowledged should ^not^ break off a negotiation which must end in the attainment of an object which they have as
much at heart as we— Whatever the sentiments of the Ct de Vergn may be as to the claim of Spain in A letter which I have seen, he treats them as well as ours as chimerical and extravagant and declares that he does not mean to interfere in them—17 You can best judge of the sincerity of this declaration— If insincere I cannot conceive for what purpose it was made, or the subject treated so lightly— Or why this should be confided to me— For my own part I believe their situation with respect to Spain is very delicate18 and that they are embarrassed by her demands— I mention these things, that you may by comparing them with facts within your reach you may draw useful inferences from them— And I wish to give you every thing that may possibly be of use to you— As to the Letter of Marbois I am by no means surprised at it, since he always endeavored to persuade us that our claim to the fisheries was not well founded. Yet one thing is very remarkable, & I hope evinces the determination of France to serve us on this point. The advise given to discourage the hope is certainly judicious, & yet we find no steps taken in consequence of it—on the contrary we have been repeatedly told in formal communications since that period, “that the King would do every thing for us that circumstances will admit, & that nothing but dire necessity shall induce him to relinquish any of the objects we have at heart, & that he does not imagine that such necessity will exist”— This communication was made on the 21st. of last November19 From Letters of the 7th of Sepr, previous to our success at York town, & has been renued at different periods since you will undoubtedly avail yourself of this engagement if necessary, since Congress relying upon it have made no alteration in their instructions20 since the change in their affairs by the blow the enemy have recd at York town—This Letter of Marbois and the conduct of the Court Of France evinces the difference between a great politician, & a little one, France can by prohibiting the importation of fish supply herself—she can not do more—our exclusion from the fishery would only be beneficial to England— The enmity it would excite the disputs it would give rise to, would in the course of a few years obliterate the memory of the favors we have received. England by sacrificing a part of her fisheries, & protecting us in the Enjoyment of them, would render herself necessary to us, our friendship would be transfered to her, & France would in the end be considered as a natural enemy— I am persuaded she has wisdom enough to see this in its true light.21
I know not how far [the] Marquis22 may deserves your confidence you are the best judge of his conduct—23 I ought however in Justice to him to mention that he has steadily in all his Letters recommended an adherence to our claims, & assured us that both might be attained if insisted upon—24 You see Sir I have purposely leaned to the opposite side from that which you appear in some measure to have taken— Not because I think you are wrong in the25 opinion you have adopted, but because you may possibly be so. Such essential injuries may flow from the slightest jealousies that I wish you to examine yours with all the coolness you are master off— I am persuaded that the Last hope of Britain is founded on the distrusts they may sow among their enemies—
I wish you had in a private letter in cypher informed me how you got at the letter of Marbois and why it was copied in English— I more particularly wish to know whether it passed thro’ the hands of either of the british commissioners— If it has it will be of some consequence to see the original— Not that I doubt its authenticity, But it may possibly have undergone some alterations— That which follows what is said of the great bank is nonsense or if it conveys any meaning, I think it is not such as a man of common sense would speak.26
Ct: de Vergennes in his Letters dated a day later than yours, gives no account of your propositions—27 I should conclude from the circumstance that they had not been communicated— If I was not convinced that acting under the instructions you do, you would not withhold them except for the most weighty reasons, & that if such reasons existed you would have assigned them in your Letters—& presuming, therefore that you had communicated them, I have made no secret of them to the Ct. DeLaLuzerne, who appeared much pleased with them, tho’ a little surprized at the article which relates to commerce,28 which I can not suppose perfectly agreeable to them in all its extent— Since it will render a revolution necessary in the commercial system of France if they wish to have an extensive trade with us— I am extreamly pleased that in freeing our selves, we have a prospect of unfettering the consciences, & the commerce, of the world.
We are far from regretting that the Marquis D’Aranda has no powers to treat, we think with you that it is time to adopt the Spanish system—we may treat at any time with more advantage than at present. You have recd. your instructions on this subject before you wrote your Last Letters— By your saying nothing of them you had not decyphered them.29
Mr. Jefferson being the bearer of this it is unnecessary to enlarge,30 News and Genl politicks will be contained in my Letters to Docr. Franklin31 to whom I also send an instruction on the subject of yr commercial proposition—32 I enclose you a new cypher which I pray you to make use of—you will find it very easy, on a little practice—33 I must again entreat you to write more fully to us. I have received from the Ct De Vergennes letters the whole progress of the negotiations. Information of this kind it would give me more pleasure to receive thro’ another channel— I have the honor to be Dr Sir with great respect & esteem Your most obt Hum: Servt
R. R. Livingston34
P.S. The cypher used is Docr Franklin’s wth this office—being no. 4—
ALS, partly in cipher, decoded by JJ, dated 4 Jan. 1783, NNC (EJ: 7943 and 7945). Dft, NHi: R. R. Livingston, dated 30 Dec., but endorsed as “No 16 / Dr Letter to / Mr Jay / 3d Jany 1783 / Secret” (EJ: 1539); LbkC, dated 30 Dec., DNA: PCC, item 118: 384–97 (EJ: 9928). Encoded in Office of Finance Code no. 4 (Franklin Code) (WE008), which RRL had adopted for use in his correspondence with BF (RRL to BF, 16 Dec. 1781, , 36: 262, and n9).
The text published by Francis Wharton is based on the DNA LbkC (referred to at that time as in the record book in the manuscripts of the Department of State) and is dated 30 Dec., while Jared Sparks appears to have worked from the ALS, which he published under date of 4 Jan. 1783. Wharton noted that although such official copies were generally made after signature but before transmission of the original letters, in this case the two texts differed materially in mode of expression, and for that reason he published both texts. See , 6: 173–76, 176n–180n. , 3: 14–19 published the 4 Jan. text. Since the differences are primarily stylistic rather than substantive they have not been noted; however, major excisions from the original draft are recorded below. In general, RRL removed the more personal references in the original draft and adopted a more formal and official tone, while making the final version more forceful than what appeared in the LbkC.
1. See JJ’s private letter to RRL of 4 Sept., and his letters addressed to RRL as Secretary for Foreign Affairs of 18 Sept. and 13 Oct., all 1782, above.
2. A reference to the controversial instructions to the peace commissioners of 15 June 1781, : 469–71, which directed the American negotiators to confide fully in the French minister and to be guided by his advice.
3. “For” written over “of”.
4. In the NHi Dft, “some time”.
5. Here in the NHi Dft RRL excised: “I know you too well to believe that these opinions have been hastily adopted—& yet I can not but entertain some” before interlining “I wish so much that your conjectures may not be well founded that I am led to” and continuing “hope that you carry your suspicions ^too^ far- ther than you ^they^ should go.”
6. Madison, whose opinions with regard to France RRL often shared, had also noted the difference of opinion between BF and JJ.
7. Here in the NHi Dft RRL excised: “between you”.
8. Here in the NHi Dft RRL excised: “You seem to suppose that France would not wish an explicit acknowledgment of our independence to the [illegible] attained both her objects & those of Spain.”
9. Here in the Dft RRL wrote: “For having been rendered easy ^For when satisfied^ on that point we can without difficulty turn our attention to the promotion of ^will more readily labour for to the Attainment of^ those which our allies have at heart.”
10. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “by which our favorite object is to be obtained.”
11. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “But I promised you facts you are capable of drawing your own inferences from them.” He then continued, “The Minister before your letters were recd.” before excising “& of course before the contents of them could be known (if unhappily they should ever be) to him.”
12. Vergennes’s position early in the negotiations is described in “The Status of the Peacemaking on John Jay’s Arrival in Paris” (editorial note), on pp. 1–5; and , 1: 432–34.
13. Vergennes to La Luzerne, 12 Aug. 1782, , 1: 524–27.
14. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “concludes that you are to have a conference upon the subject. In a postscript to that Letter he gives the result of the conference in which you adhere to your objections & determine to make them— And concludes with saying that tho’ he does not consider the proposed alteration essential yet he wishes they may be made tho’ if they should not be consented to he does not think the Negotiations ought to break offbecause G.B. does not [illegible] ^begin^ where she ought to must end—”. RRL then interlined “his doubt of the manner in which these objections will be recd if says he (as Mr. Oswald intimates they will receive ^admit^ their proposition force of the objections every thing is said if they should reject them because they will not begin where they should leave offp ropose to end I conceive the negotiation should still go on— We may judge of the intention of the court of London by their 1st Propositions if they have independence for their basis we may proceed if not we must break off— These obs”.
15. , 1: 559–60.
16. Ibid., 615–18.
17. Letter not found
18. For similar views expressed earlier by Madison, see , 5: 441–42.
19. The LbkC reads “23d of November, 1781”; the Dft reads “23d Novr”.
20. The congressional instructions of 15 June 1781, cited in note 2, above.
21. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “and that she will grant for policy what we pursue for [extraction?]”.
22. “Marquis La fayette” in the Dft.
23. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “There is however one testimony in his favor which I can not”.
24. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “if this was not conformable to the views of his court he certainly committed himself unnecessarily or [feigned? pugned?] himself upon his fidelity to us.”
25. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “Ideas you entertain. for you have given me no facts to ground my Judgment upon.”
26. Here in the Dft RRL excised: “You know mankind & your opponents too well not be upon your guard against their artifices—”
Barbé-Marbois had suggested that Britain might “work” to have Americans admitted to the fisheries of the Grand Bank to win their affection or to obtain some compensation. See , 1: 315–16.
27. See Vergennes to La Luzerne, 14 Oct. 1782, ibid., 1: 615–18, in which Vergennes remarked that he had been informed that “substantive negotiations” were underway but that he was unable to say anything about them because JJ and BF were “holding themselves in the most absolute reserve in my regard.” He then asked La Luzerne to report this to RRL so that he would, if he judged it appropriate, remind them “of the tenor of their instructions.” He then specified that La Luzerne should not register this as a complaint, and that he should “pray Mr. Livingston not to make any reproach” to them “because that would give them dissatisfaction, which must be avoided.”
28. See the fourth article of the Preliminary Articles, First Draft, under 5–8 Oct. 1782, above, which would have restored trade between Britain and America to its status prior to the American Revolution.
29. See RRL to JJ, 8 Aug. 1782, above.
30. Congress had renewed Jefferson’s appointment to the peace commission on 13 Nov. 1782. His departure was delayed and his mission eventually cancelled when news reached Congress that the preliminary treaty had been signed on 30 Nov. 1782. A version of the present letter may have been carried on the Emeraude, which carried dispatches to this date and reached France in mid-February. JJ acknowledged receipt of letters through 3 Jan. in his letter to RRL of 7 Apr.; but he did not specifically reply to this letter, referred to as one of 4 Jan., until his letter of 1 June 1783, both below. Barney did not arrive in France with the originals until July 1783. See , 7: 263, 264, 761.
31. See RRL to BF, 21 and 27 Nov., 3 and 6 Dec. 1782, and 2 Jan. 1783, , 38: 331–33; 367–68, 405–6, 421, 537–38.
32. RRL’s letter to BF of 2 Jan. 1783, cited in note 31, which enclosed a congressional resolution of 31 Dec. 1782 instructing the American peace commissioners to try to obtain direct commerce with all parts of the British Empire. See , 23: 875; and , 5: 476–77.
33. In his reply of 1 June 1783, below, JJ indicated that the code (not found) was missing.
34. For JA’s comments of 25 May 1783 on this letter, see , 14: 492–96.