It is not a new observation that the People at of any country (if like ours us ^the americans^ intelligent and left to the well informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere in an for many Years, in an erroneous opinion respecting their Interests; and that Consideration leads me ^naturally tends^ to have ^create^ great Respect for the uniform the high opinion which the People of america have ever ^so long &^ uniformly entertained of the Importance of their continuing firmly united under one fœderal Governt. vested with sufficient Purposes Powers for all general & national Purposes.

The more attentively I consider & investigate the Reasons on whic which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.

Among the many objects to which a wise and free People find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first—The safety of the People doubtless has relation to a va great variety ^of^ circumstances & considerations and consequently comprehends affords great Latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.

At present I mean only to consider it as it respects Security for the Preservation of Peace & Secur Tranquility, as well against Dangers from foreign arms and Influence, as from Dangers of the like kind originating ^arising^ from domestic Causes.

As the former of these comes first in order it is proper that it should be ^the^ first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine and consider whether the People are not right in their opinion that a fœderal union & an ^strict cordial union of all the States^ under an efficient national Governt. can affords them the best Security that can be devised against Hostilities from abroad—

The number of wars that have happened and will ^or will^ happen in the world, will always ^be found to^ be in Proportion to the Number & Weight of Causes whether real or pretended which provoke or invite them—If this Remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire, whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by united america, as by disunited america, for if it should turn out that united america will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this Respect, the union tends greatly ^most^ to preserve the Peace People in a State of Peace with other Nations.

Among The just Causes of War for the most part arise from either from Violations of Faith in the Breach of Treaties, or from direct violence America has already formed Treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them except Prussia are maritime ^& thus able to annoy & injure^ They She has also extensive Connections with Sp Portugal, and and Spain ^& Britain^ and with Respect to the ^two^ latter has also the [Rights?] ^circumstance^ of neighbourhood to attend to—

It is of high Importance to the Peace of america that she observe the Faith of Treaties and the Laws of Nations towards towards all these Powers, and ^to me^ it appears to me very evident, that this will be more perfectly and punctually ^done^ by by one national Governmt. than it would be either by each ^the thirteen separate^ states separately or by three or four ^different distinct^ Confederacies—

Because when once an efficient national Govt. is established, the best men in the Country will be ^will not only consent to serve, but also will^ generally be appointed to manage it, for altho Town or Country ^or other contracted^ Influence may send a ^place^ men to a ^in^ State assembly^ies^ or Senates or place him in ^a^ Courts of Justice ^or executive Departments—^ yet ^more^ general ^& extensive^ Reputation for Talents & Integrity ^other Qualifications^ will be necessary to recommend men and to Places ^offices^ under the fœd national Governt.—which there ^especially as it^ will also be more ^have a widestr^ field for choice, and no lack of ^& never experience that want of^ proper Persons, as is often the Case in several ^which is not uncommon in some^ of the States Hence it will follow ^result^ that the ^administration the political^ counsels ^& ^^the^^ Judicial Decisions^ of the National Government will probably be more temperate wise, ^systematical,^ and expedient and judicious, than those of individual States or of ^or little Confederacies^ and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations as well as more safe with Respect to us.

Because under the national Governmt. but Treaties and articles of Treaties ^as well as the Laws of Nations^ will always be expounded in one Sense, and executed in one Manner—whereas the the adjudications of the on the same points ^& Questions^ in thirteen States or in three or four Confederacies will not always harmonize ^accord^ or be consistent ^[in margin] & that as well from the variety of ^^independent^^ Courts & Judges appointed by different ^^& independent^^ Governts., as from ^^their^^ peculiar ^^and different^^ local Laws & ^^Interests^^ which may affect the Case ^^& influence them^^ Hence ^^[Now observing in?]^^ The wisdom of the convention in committing those causes ^^such Questions^^ to the Jurisdiction ^^& Decision judgment^^ of national Courts is very striking appointed [existing?] & contrould only by ^^the authy of^^ ^^of Courts^^ ^^to be appointed by and responsible only to the ^^one^^ national Govt. cannot be too much commended^

Because the Prospect of present ^Loss or^ Advantage may often tempt ^the governing party in^ one or two States to deviation ^swerve^ from good Faith & Justice; but the others States not being aff those Temptations not reaching the others States and consequently having little ^or no^ Influence on the national Government, the Temptation will be rendered ineffectual ^fruitless^ & the wrong prevented— ^good faith and justice preserved^— The case of the Treaty of Peace ^of with Britain^ adds ^great^ weight to this Reason— & thus by showing Facts the Dangerous Effects of State Interests & Prejudice on Tr.

Because even if the governing Party in a State should be disposed to resist ^such^ Temptations, yet those ^as such^ Temptations may ^& often do commonly do^ result from local Circumstances merely local & peculiar to them State ^and ^^may^^ affecting a great number of the Inhabitants^ it may not be in power of the governing Party ^may not always be able if willing^ to prevent the Injustice meditated ^or ^^to^^ punish the agressors^—but the national Government not being affected by those local circumstances, will have no ^neither be^ Inducedment ^either^ to commit it, ^themselves ^^wrong^^ themselves^ nor any want Power ^nor Inclination either^ to prevent its being done by others— ^or try to punish its [illegible] commission by others^

So far therefore as ^either designed or accidental^ violations of Treaties & of the Laws of Nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general Governmt. than under several lesser ones, and in that Respect the former most favors the Safety of the People.

Nor As to those ^just^ Causes of War which proceed from direct and unlawful violence it appears equally clear to to me that a ^one^ good national Governmt. affords m vastly more Security against Dangers of that Sort, than can be derived from any other S Quarter

Because if such the Danger ^the Probability^ of such violences arises are more frequently caused by the Passions of & Interests of a Part than of the whole, of one or two States than of the thirteen ^Union^. Not^t a^ indian single Indian war has yet been occasioned by ^any^ aggressions of the Union ^present^ fœderal Govt. feeble as it is, but more than one instan ^there are several^ Instances of Indian Hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States who either unwilling or unable to restrain off or punish offences, have given occasion to the Slaughter of thou ^many^ innocent Inhabitants.

The neighbourhood of the Spanish & british Territories bordering on some States and not on others ^naturally^ confines the Causes of Quarrels ^more immediately^ to the borderers and The bordering States if any, will be those who under the Impulse of momentary ^sudden^ Irritation, and a quick sense of apparent Interest or Injury, will be more prone to violence than the ^the more^ ^[in margin] most likely to excite war with those nations and nothing can so null effectually guard us against ^^obviate^^ that danger to which [be without?] the Imprudence and Passions of such States will naturally be liable, as^ ^a^ national Governt. which will never act without Examination, and whose wisdom and Prudence will not be diminished by the Passions which actuate the Parties immediately interested.

but not only [none?] few^er^ just causes of war will be given by the national Government, but it will also be more in their power to compromise ^accommodate^ & settle them amicably They will be more temperate & cool, and in that respect as well as in others, will be more in Capacity to act advisedly than the offending State as th The Pride of States as well as of men naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes their either acknowledging correcting or repairing their Errors in on ^&^ offences. The national Government in such cases will ^not^ be affected by this Pride; but will soberly proceed with Moderation ^& Candor^ to consider and decide what it is best to be done ^on the means most proper^ to extricate the Nation from the Difficulties which threaten them.

Besides it is well known that acknowledgments Explanations and Excuses ^compensations^ are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or little Confederacy less formidable ^of little Consideration or power^

In the year 1685 the State of Genoa ^having^ offended Louis the 14th.—and he insisted ^endeavoured to appease him—he demanded^ that they should send their Dudge w Doge with f ^and or chief Magistrate^ accompanied by four of their Senators to France to ask his Pardon and recieve his Terms—They were ^obliged^ to submitted to it ^for the sake of peace^—Would he in a similar Case ^on any occasion^ have made such a ^either^ Demanded or ^or have^ recd. the like Humiliation from Spain ^or^ Britain or any other powerful Nation?—I think he would not—