The Parties and Divisions amgst us many [may?] several Ways bring Destruction upon our Country, at the same time that our united house wd secure us agt. all the Attempts of a foreign Enemy

Addison1

In My last Papers assigned several Reasons why the ^safety of the^ People will ^wd^ be best secured by Union against the Dangers it may [be] exposed to ^by^ just Causes of War given to other nations and those Reasons shew that such Causes will ^wd^ not only be more rar^e^ly given, but willd also be more easily obser extinguished ^accommodated & amicably settled^ by a national Governmt. ^than either^ by by any lesser or partial ones the State Governments or the proposed little Confederacies—2

But The But the Safety of the People of america depends not against Dangers from foreign Force, depends not only on their forbearg to give just cause of Offence ^war^ to foreign na other Nations, but also on their on their placing and continuing Themselves in such a Situ Situation as not to Invite Insult and Hostility ^and or Insult^ for it need not be observed that there are pretended as well as just Causes of war.

It is too true however disgraceful it may be to human Nature, that Nations and particularly Monarchies ^in general^ will make War right or wrong whenever they have a Prospect of getting any Thing by it. I say ^whenever they have a prospect of getting any Thing by it^ particularly ^absolute^ Monarchies—& it is only from Monarchies that we have ^the most^ Danger to apprehend.

Monarchs are often impelled to war to gratify their personal ambition, to revenge personal affronts, to support their and aggrandize, their Brothers or Sisters, or Partizans  Monarchs are frequently influenced to War by insidious Favorites ^&^ artful mistresses employed by other Powers to practice upon them—Republics on the contrary being governed by many men, & by many men in Rotation; are not liable to be precipitated into War by any such Causes; and therefore ^under a well established Govt.^ they keep Peace and good Faith much better than monarchies—Independent of these adventitious Causes, which also merit Attention, there are others which gain rights out of our relative Situation and Circumstances

^[in margin] And nay that absolute monarchs will often make war when their Nations are to get Nothing by it for Purposes & Objects merely personal such as [illegible] a thirst for military Glory Revenge for personal affronts ambition ^^or private Compacts^^ to aggrandize or support their ^^particular^^ Families Brothers Sisters Sons and or Partizans—These and a variety of motives wh. affect only the minds of the Sovereign, often lead him to engage in Wars not sanctified by ^^Justice or^^ the voice & Interests of his People—But independent of these Inducem[en]ts to war which are peculiar to ^absolute^ monarchies, but which will deserve our Attention there are many others which affect Nations as well as kings & which ^^some of them will on Examination be found to^^ grow out of our relative Situation & Circumstances—^

with France and with Britain we are Rivals in the Fisheries, and can supply their Markets cheaper than they can themselves notwithstanding their any Efforts to prevent it by Bounties on their own and Duties on ours ^foreign Fish^

With them and most other ^European^ Nations we are Rivals in Navigation & ^the^ carrying Trade, and ours cannot increase without in some degree diminishing that of ^as^ we shall decieve ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see [it flourish?] ^[in margin] for ^^as^^ our carrying Trade cannot increase without in some Degree diminishing theirs, it is more their Interest & will be more their policy to restrain than extend ^^to promote^^ it^3

In the Trade to China and India we interfere with others the the commercial Interest of other ^with more than one^ Nations in as much as we ^it enables us to^ partake in Benefits ^Advantages^ which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with Commodities which we used to purchase of ^from^ them4

The Extension of our ^own^ Commerce in our ^own^ Vessels cannot give Pleasure to any Nations who possess insular Poss Territories either on or in the vicinity of ^near^ this Continent because the cheapness and Excellence of our Production, the Dis Expedition & added to the Circumstance of Vicinity, and the commercial Enterprize and address which distinguishes ^of^ our Merchants & Navigators, will give us some ^a greater^ Share in the advantages affor which those Territories afford and ^from^ which to exclude us from which than consists with the present ^wishes or^ Policy or Wishes of their respective Sovereigns—

Spains thinks it convenient to shut the Missisippi against us on the one Side,5 and Britain guards the Mouth of ^excludes us from^ the St Laurence against us on the other, nor will they ^either of them^ permit the other waters that lay between ^divide^ ^wh are^ [between] them and us to become the Means of mutual Intercourse and Traffic—

From these and such like Considerations which might ^if consistant with Prudence^ be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that Jealousies and Uneasinesses in may gradually slide into the Minds and Cabinets of other nations; and that there are some among them who will not ^we are not to expect tthat they shd.^ regard our Advancemt. in Union in Power and Consequence by Land & by Sea, with an Eye of Indifference and Composure.

The People of america are aware ^that^ Inducements to war may arise out of these Circumstances, ^as well as from others not so obvious at present^ and that when this whenever such Inducements may find fit Time and opportunity for operations, Pretences to coulor and justify them will not be wanting wisely therefore in my Opinion do they consider a ^union & a^ good national Government as necessary to put ^& keep^ them in such a Situation as instead of inviting offence may rather ^war will^ tend to repress the Effects of Patent Jealously and discourage it—That Situation consists in the best possible State of Defence and necessary^il^y calls into View the ^depends on the^ Governmt. the arms and the Resources of the Country—

That on As the Safety of the whole is the Interest of the whole, and cannot be provided for without Government, either one or more or many; let any sensible Man as judge whether the ^us inquire whether^ one ^good^ Govt. is not not relative to the Object in Question, more competent than any ^other^ given greater Number Whatever—

one Government ^can^ collect and avails itself of the Wisdom ^Talents^ and Experience of the ablest Men, in whatever part of the union they may be found—it ^can^ moves on uniform Principles of Policy—it ^can^ harmonizes informs ^assimilates^ and protects our the several Parts & Members by equal Regulation, and extends ^to each^ [also?] ^the Benefits of its^ Foresight and Precautions to each ^to each^—In the Formation of Treaties its ^will^ regards the w Interest of the whole, and the particular Interests of the Parts as connected with ^that of^ the whole. It can apply the Resources and Power of the Whole to the Defence of any particular Part;—and ^& that^ more easily & expeditiously than the State Governmts. ^or separate Confederacies^ can possibly do for want of concert and unity of System—it can place the Militia under one Plan of Discipline, and by having all ^putting^ their officers placed in a proper Line of Subordination to the chief magistrate will render by ^as it were^ consolidate them as it were into one Corps ^& thereby^ render them more efficient than they can possibly be ^would be^ if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct & independent Bodies—

What what ^wd.^ the Militia of Britain be if the English militia obeyed the King ^a the Govt.^ of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed a King^ ^the Govt^ of Scotland and if the welch militia obeyed a King ^the Govt^ of Wales? Suppose an Invasion, would these three Kings ^Goverts. (if they agreed at all) be able with all their respective Forces to operate against the Enemy as ^so^ effectually as a King ^the single Govt.^ of great Britain would—

We have heard much of the Fleets of Britain, and the Time may come ^if we are wise^ when the Fleets of america may engage attention But if one national Govt. had not ^so^ regulated the Navigation of Britain as to make it a Nursery for Seamen—if one national Governmt had not called forth all the ^national^ Means and materials for forming Fleets their prowess and Thunder would never have been celebrated—Let England have its Navigation and Fleet—let Scotland have its Navigation and Fleet, let Wales have its Navigation and Fleet, let Ireland have its Navigation, as let those four ^of the^ constituent Parts of the british Empire be distin be under four independent Govts. and it is easy to percieve how soon they would each dwindle into comparative Insignificance—

Apply these Facts to our own Case—leave america divided into thirteen or if you please into three or four ^independent^ Governments—what armies could they raise and pay; what Fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, wh would the others fly to their ^its^ Succour, and spend there Blood and money in its Defence; or would there be no Danger of [illegible] their being flattered or bribed ^into Neutrality^ by specious Promises, and ^or^ seduced ^into it^ by a too great Fondness for Peace, to ^decline^ hazardg their Tranquility & Lives ^present Safety^ for the Sake of neighbours of whom perhaps they have been jealous, & whose Importance they have no Objections ^are content^ to see Diminished—That would be ^altho such conduct wd. not be wise it wd. nevertheless be^ natural but it would not be wise—The History of Greece the States of Greece and of of other Countries abound however with such Instances and ^it is not improbable that^ what has so often happened since may ^wd.^ under similar Circumstances happen again—

But admit that they might be wise and that they wd ^willing to^ help their Neighbours ^the invaded State or Confederacy^ How are they to do ^it^ In ^& when & in ^ what proportion shall aids ^of men & money^ be afforded—who shall command the allied armies—^To whom From wh. of them shall he recieve his orders^—who shall settle the Terms of Peace ^[in margin] & in Case of Disputes, what umpire shall decide between them & compel acquiescence^ are Questions that must arise & be decided—^This and many [illegible] are obvious^ various Difficulties and Inconveniences would be inseparable from such a Situation—whereas one Govt directing the ^watching over the general & common^ Interests, and ^combining &^ directing the powers and Resources of the world ^whole^ would be free from all these Embarrassments, and conduce far more to the Safety of the People—

But whatever may be our Situation, whether firmly united under one national Governmt. or split into a number of confederacies, certain it is that foreign Nations will know and see ^view it exactly as it is^ ^and they will act towards [us] accordingly^ If they find us [no?] acting as one Nation—if they see ^that^ our National Govt. wisely ^is efficient & well^ administered—our Trade prudently regulated, our militia well ^properly^ organized and disciplined, our Resources and Finances discretely managed—our Credit reestablished—our People free, contented and united—they will be ^much^ more disposed to cultivate our Friendship and than provoke our Resentments—

If on the other Hand they find us either without efficient ^destitute of an effectual^ Government, each State doing what as to ^doing^ right or wrong as to the governing party ^its Rulers^ may seem convenient—or split into Factions or three or four independent unconnected ^& probably discordant independent^ Republics or Confederacies one inclining to Britain, another to France and a third to Spain, and ^perhaps^ played off agst. each other by the three; what a poor pitiful Figure will America make? and how ^How^ liable will ^wd.^ she become not only to ^their^ Contempt and but to ^their^ outrage—What a Pity it would be that such a House and Family should be ^so^ divided; for if divided, great Reason is there to fear that it would soon be against itself and how soon will wd she discover ^dear bough[t] Experience proclaim^ that when she divided her ^a^ People or Family so divide, they divide ^it never fails to be^ agst. themselves