Permit me to address the enclosed Memorial to your Excellencies, and to explain to you my reasons for so doing.1 It is because many consequences, now at a great distance, and unforeseen by us, may arise between our two Countries, perhaps from very minute & incidental transactions, which in their beginnings may be imperceptible & unsuspected as to their future effects. Our respective territories are in vicinity, and therefore we must be inseparable. Great Britain, with the British power in America, is the only nation, with which, by absolute necessity, you must have the most intimate concerns, either of friendship or hostility. All other nations are 3000 miles distant from you; you may have political connexion with any of these distant nations, but with regard to to Great Britain, it must be so. Political intercourse and interests will obtrude themselves between our two Countries, because they are the two great powers dividing the Continent of North America. These matters are not to come into discussion between us now. They are of too much importance, either to be involved, or even glanced at in any present transaction.

Let every eventual principle be kept untouched until the two nations shall have recovered from the animosities of war. Let them have a pacific interval to consider deliberately of their mutual & combined interests, and of their engagements with other powers. Let us not, at the outset of a temporary Convention, adopt the severe principle of reducing every transaction between the two nations, to the footing of strict reciprocity alone. Such a principle would cast a gloom upon conciliatory prospects. America is not restrained from any conciliation with Great Britain, by any treaty with any other power. The principles of conciliation would be the most desireable between Great Britain & America, and forebearance is the road to conciliation. After a war of animosities time should be allowed for recollection. There are all reasonable appearances of conciliatory dispositions on all sides, which may be perfected in time. Let us not therefore at such a moment as this, and without the most urgent necessity, establish a morose principle between us. If it were a decided point against amity & conciliation, it would be time enough to talk of partition & strict reciprosity. To presume in favour of conciliation, may help it forward, to presume against it may destroy that conciliation which might otherwise have taken place. But in the present case there is more than reason to presume conciliation. I think myself happy, that I have it in my power to assure you, from authority, that it is the fundamental principle of the British Councils to establish amity & confidence between Great Britain & the American States, as a succedaneum2 for the relation in which they formerly stood, one to the other. The proof of this consists not in words, but in substantial facts. His Britannic Majesty has been most graciously pleased to send orders to his Commanders in North America, for the speedy & complete evacuation of the territories of the United States.3 His Majesty has given orders in Council, on 14th last month, for the admission of American Ships & Cargo into Great Britain, and on the 6th Inst he has given further orders, permitting the importation from America of several articles, which have been usually considered as manufactures. He has likewise provided for the convenience of American Merchants, who may wish to land Tobacco in Great Britain for reexportation. Upon the same principle Mr Fox, the Secretary of State, corresponding with America, has moved for, and received, the leave of the House of Commons (nem: con) to bring in a Bill that any American Merchants, importing Rice into Great Britain, may, upon reexportation, draw back the whole duty paid on its first importation.4 All these circumstances put together, undoubtedly form the most indisputable evidence of the disposition, which prevails in the British Councils to give every facility to the reestablishment of that intercourse which must prove so beneficial to both nations. I am ordered to inform you that his Majesty entirely approves of the plan for making a temporary convention, for the purposes of restoring immediate intercourse & commerce, and more particularly for the purpose of putting off for a time, the decision of that important question, how far the British acts of navigation ought to be sacrificed to commercial considerations drawn from the peculiar circumstances of the present Crisis: a question which will require much deliberation and very much enquiry before it can be determined. I am sure, Gentlemen, you will see & admit the reasonableness of our proceeding in such a case with deliberation & discretion, more especially when these acts of prudence do not proceed from any motives of coolness & reserve towards you. For the mean time, the temporary convention may proceed upon principles of real & accomodating reciprocity. For instance, we agree to put you upon a more favourable footing than any other nation. We do not ask a rigid reciprocity for this, because we know by your present subsisting treaties it is not in your power to give it to us. We desire only to be put upon the foot of other nations with you, and yet we consent that you shall be upon a better footing with us than any other nation. Thus far we must be allowed to be giving something more than reciprocity, and this we do, because, as I said before, we are unwilling to ask what you are unable to give. Surely it is not unreasonable, nor more than from principles of reciprocity we have a right to expect, that you should imitate our conduct in this particular, and that you should abstain from asking this under the title of exact & literal reciprocity; which you must know, upon the consideration of our case, that we are unable to give. Virtual & substantial reciprocity we are willing to give, literal reciprocity is impossible, as well from your engagements as from our system of Navegation.

If we can agree upon an article of Intercourse & commerce, in the nature of a temporary Convention, on the basis of the memorial, which I had lately the honour of giving to you, bearing date 19th May 1783, no time need be lost in finishing this business: but with this explanation, that, although it is proposed, that the Commerce between the United States & the British-West-Indian Islands, should be free with regard to their respective productions, yet that we are not bound to admit the importation of West-Indian commodities into Great Britain, in American Vessels.5 Beleive me Gentlemen, that this restriction does not proceed from any invideous disposition towards the American States. It is imposed by indispensable prudence & necessity on the British Ministers, who, in the present state of things, could not be justified to their own Country in going hastily to such an extent of concession. This point is not to be looked upon, as merely commercial, but as affecting fundamentally the great political system of British Navigation, and you are to consider that the principle, on which the whole of our proposed temporary convention is to stand, is, that the Commerce between the two Countries is to be revived nearly on the old footing; but that each nation is to keep in its own hands the power of making such regulation respecting Navegation as shall seem fit. I assure you that this point has been discussed by the Ministers of the British Cabinet with infinite candour, and with every possible disposition of favour towards your Country, but the more they have enquired upon this subject, the more they have been overborne by the conviction that the prejudices upon this matter, (if that be the names these opinions deserve) are so strong, that such a measure as the declaration of the Act of Navegation in this instance, never can be taken, but upon such a full & solemn parliamentary enquiry, as it is impossible to go into at this time of the year, and in this stage of the sessions.6 I cannot therefore, Gentlemen, help flattering myself, that you are so well acquainted with the difficulties, which must embarrass an English Administration in a business of this sort, as to endeavour rather to remove them than encrease them, and I am sure that such a plan on your part, would ultimately be most conducive to your objects. When an amicable intercourse is once opened and when conciliatory confidence comes to take place of those jealousies, which have lately subsisted, you may easily conceive in how different a manner the whole of this matter will be considered. I am confident that this will be the case, but if it is not, the provisions being only temporary, it will be in the power of the United States to take up a more hostile mode of proceeding by restraints prohibitions &ca, whenever they may think fit.

I have made use above of the word prejudices in speaking of the principles of the British Act of Navegation. I hope you will accept that term from me, as proceeding so far in compliance towards the future consideration of the points now between us, as to keep the question open and free for discussion. If Great Britain should in any case throw down the barriers of the act of Navegation towards America, she should be very secure against the possible case of future enmity or alliance against her. Such considerations as these lead to objects far beyond our present scope of powers. But I must still add one word more upon this article of prejudices. Such prejudices (if they are so) are not confined to Great Britain. By your Commercial Treaty with France, Article 4th, you are only entitled to an European treaty with that kingdom, and by that treaty, not even to any direct-commerce between their West Indian Islands, and the Ports of the American States, much less to the immediate communication between the French Islands & the Dominions of the Crown of France in Europe.7

Every public proceeding in England, since the commencement of our negotiation for opening intercourse & commerce between our two Countries, will I am sure, support me in saying that we have very liberally taken the lead, that we have not waited for any assurances of reciprocity, but have given orders for an almost universal admission of American Articles, before we know that any vessel from Great Britain will find even admission into any American Ports— What do we ask in return? No more than this: That while we gratuitously & without stipulation give advantages and favours to the American States, which we deny to all other nations, they would so far justify our liberal way of proceeding, as to receive us in the same manner as other nations, which are foreign, and to permit us to carry to North America, what it is evidently for her interest, that we should carry thither.

I need hardly add that it is of infinite importance that some temporary convention should be finished without loss of time. I hope & trust that we shall not find much more difficulty in this business. You must see the advantage of an immediate renewal of intercourse. And from the candour of your dispositions I am sure that you will likewise be convinced, that to give us some facility in the outset, is the sure road to such an equitable arrangement for the future, as you must have at Heart. The reasons which I have given in the Memorial dated 1st June Inst appear to me to be cogent & convincing on the natural alliance between our two Countries, and when the intercourse has once begun, every thing will go in its natural road. It is therefore of infinite importance to begin that intercourse. Great Britain by all public proceedings, of repeals, proclamations &c &ca has made the first advances with warmth, & with confidence, and therefore I conclude with the fullest assurance that you will meet those advances with cordial reciprocity I have the honor to be Gentlemen, With the greatest respect & consideration Your most Obedient humble Servant