His Excellency General Washington, has shewn me a Letter of General Sullivan’s to Congress, wherein he exclaims against the force and preparations for the Expedition he is sent upon; particularly against the preparation in the Quarter Master’s Department.1

It was the 2nd of March before His Excellency, General Washington determined upon the plan of operation. This was owing to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary information, whether to carry on the expedition by the way of the Susquehannah, or Fort Schuyler. Had it gone on by the way of Fort Schuyler, the preparation in that quarter had been so liberal, with respect to Boats for another expedition which had been in contemplation; that few, if any, would have been wanted more than was at hand;—therefore it was unnecessary to give an order for any early preparations in that quarter.2 But upon the most diligent enquiry, and from the best information of the state of the Magazines of Flour and other provisions at Albany, together with the difficulty of entering the Indian Country to advantage upon that route, determined the General to make his approaches by the way of the Susquehannah. But, as I said before, it was late in the season before he was decided upon this point.

After I receiv’d the General’s Instructions upon this business, every measure was taken to collect men and materials for executing the work. The Men were to be collected from different Governments, even as far as Albany; and the materials were mostly growing in the Woods. Major Eyre was appointed to superintend the building of the Boats:3 His knowledge, activity and zeal are so well known to the Board of War, that I think it unnecessary to say anything upon this head. His orders were positive and pressing; and I believe no Man could have made greater exertions than he did to accomplish the business. My orders were to build 150 two-ton Batteaus, and to provide eight or ten Boats, already built, of a larger size.— Upon examining the navagation of the River, the Batteaus were found unsuitable for the service: the stream was too rapid, and too many rocks were interspersed in the River for such flat-bottom craft, and of so slender a make, to endure the hardships incident to the transportation. We were obliged therefore to change the construction of the Boats, and build them with keels and round futtocks. This was necessary, as well to give them strength, as to prevent their sticking upon the rocks; but this unavoidably took up more time than was sufficient to build three times the number of Batteaus. I did not understand the plan of the expedition as rendering it necessary to have all the Boats completed at the same time:— I had been taught to believe, from the nature of the expedition, that there would be several Posts establish’d as the troops moved forward into the Indian Country; from which a communication would be kept up with the place of deposit for the Stores; and therefore I thought, if the whole of the Boats had not been completed by the arrival of the Troops at Wyoming, such as were deficient, might, as soon as they were completed, be employed in transporting Stores from Post to Post. And I believe, if the expedition had not been render’d too unwieldy by the vast quantity of Stores taken along there would have been little, if any, deficiency of tonage necessary for the transportation by the arrival of the troops at that place. However, whether there was or was not, it was not owing to either a want of attention, or exertion to expedite the business. There was no particular time set for having the Boats completed in the General’s instructions; but the business was to be accomplish’d as soon as possible, and we completed nearly the tonage demanded within a few days after the arrival of the Troops at Wyoming. The number of Boats, order’d for the expedition, was thought to be a very large provision, and notwithstanding the number made did not come up to the order given, yet the size was so much larger as more than make up the deficiency.

You will see by the inclos’d order of His Excellency, that the stores which we had deposited at Estherton,4 (asserted in the remarks, and can be proved by Col. Cox’s Return) were there seasonably for the expedition at the most early period; and was abundantly sufficient for all the purposes thereof. The whole quantity deposited at Estherton was by no means intended as a supply for that expedition; and had General Sullivan consulted his real wants instead of grasping at every thing he could get, he must have been sensible of it.

I believe there never were greater exertions, or more ample provision made for any expedition whatever; and I was so far from expecting censure for any imaginary deficiency’s, that I really expected his warmest acknowledgemnts.

I was so anxious to have every thing put in a proper train upon the Susquahannah, that I sent up Major Claiborne, the 30th of April, to expedite the business, altho’ I could illy spare him from the duties of the Office in Camp, being pressed on every side at that time in the necessary preparations to put the Army in motion at Middle-brook. Notwithstanding the inconveniencies I felt from his absence, I never recalled him untill this army took the field and not then; untill Colo. Cox had engaged Major Eyre to supply his place.

The preparations that were made at Easton, the place of rendezvous, was principally under the direction of Colo. Hooper,5 and was as ample as the General’s demands were extensive.

There is one subject of complaint which astonishes me:—that is, a want of Packsaddles.— The first estimate that was made was one thousand Pack-Horses;—a demand was soon after made for 1500; but before the Troops marched from Easton, there were drafts upon the Q. Master’s department for upwards of 2200, as will appear by the inclosed Return. Colo. Hooper made 1500 Pack-Saddles;— Colo. Mitchell sent up to Easton 700;— Colo. Cook6 provided 300, and there was between 3 and 400 sent up the River, by way of the Susquahannah.— At the time he complains of the want of Pack-Saddles, there were 240 return’d on hand at Wyoming, and there were left behind upwards of 300 at Easton;— I leave Congress to judge, therefore, with what propriety the complaint was made.— I believe every body will agree the provision had been very great. And here I cannot help observing to congress what I believe I have hinted before to the Board of War, and to the Committee for superintending the Staff, that the expences and oeconomy of the Quarter Master’s Department depends infinitely more upon the Officer commanding, than the Agents conducting the business.

I am still more astonished at his representation respecting Batteau & Pack Horse men:—there were actually inlisted between two & three hundred Batteau men, (and he says not an hundred,) and upwards of 200 still remain in the service as appears by a return from Colo. Sheriff, D.Q.M.G. with the army—7 But I am told there has a considerable number left the employ, from abuses that they were subject to.— There were also inlisted between 60 and 70 PackHorse men.— More might have been had, could we have obtained Money from the Treasury in season; but the preparations were so much more extensive than either His Excellency or myself had any Idea of, that the supplies of Cash did not keep pace with the demands of the General.—

What advantage Genl. Sullivan could propose from such an unfair representation, I cannot imagine; and his insinuations of neglects are the more surprising to me, as I have an Acknowledgement, from under his own hand, that he believes there have been every possible exertion made in my Department to forward the business of his Expedition! It is not my business to arraign his conduct; neither am I disposed to censure without further knowledge; but his account betrays a want of Candour and Generosity which will do him no honor with the honest part of Mankind. I shall avoid commenting upon many things in his Letter, as my business is not to condemn, but to justify myself.8

I was so anxious for the success of that expedition, and so sensible that His Excellency would submit to any inconvenience with this Army, which was necessary to give success and dispatch in the preparations for that, that I did not scruple to distress our Affairs here, to facilitate the operation there. In a word, I gave the preparations for that expedition the lead of every other consideration; and neither pains or expence were spared to make them ample and complete. I have the honor to be, with great respect, Your Excellency’s Most Obt Servt.