Returning from an excursion to the State of New York, I found your letter of October, which on account of my absence had been committed to a Committee of Congress. They have shewn me their report,1 it will try their sentiments on a very interesting point, if it goes thro’, but ^as^ they may not suddenly come to a Resolution, and I have just heard of a Vessel will sail in two hours for Cadiz, I avail myself of it, to inform you that your Conduct, thro’ the whole of your negotiation has been particularly acceptable to Congress.2 The condition you have annexed to the proposed cession is extremely well calculated to hasten the Spanish Ministry and I think ought to be adhered to for unless some important advantage can be gained by it, the claim with the means we have of enforcing it is too valuable to be relinquished. Spain may flatter herself with the hopes of gaining that at a general peace by the favor of the mediators which she is unwilling to purchase of us by the smallest concession. In this, however, I conceive she will find when too late that a partial regard to trifling interests has led her to sacrifice those of a more extensive and important nature. Spain can have no claims to the Mississippi but what are derived from her late conquests. Our claims are valid, those of Britain are at least specious, both will be opposed to her’s at a general peace. And as she has made the cession of Gibraltar a preliminary to a peace she can hardly expect that the mediators if they gratify her in that, will add to it other countrys to which she has no claim, more particularly as the right of Britain is next to ours incontestably the best that can be set up, so that there is little doubt if the negotiation should open when the success of our affairs gives us importance in the eyes of the mediators that they will recognize our right. If, on the other hand, we should meet with any reverse of fortune those of Britain will become more respectable thereby, and the weak claims which Spain may set up from the conquest of a few inconsiderable posts in a country of such immense extent, already in part conquered and possessed by us, can only serve as arguments of unbounded ambition without establishing a right. Sound policy then certainly dictates as a sure means of attaining this great object such a vigorous prosecution of the war as will reduce Great Britain to the necessity of making the mortifying cessions which Spain requires, and give more validity to the rights with which we are willing on certain conditions to invest her. Pecuniary aids afforded to us will be the most effectual means of destroying the common enemy and reducing them to accept such terms as Spain may chuse to dictate, while the purchase of our rights will enable her to support them with dignity and to appear at the congress as a sovereign power who has supported a distressed ally without availing herself of that distress to deprive her of rights which she has paid no equivalent for. America considers her Independence, as placed beyond all doubt She begins now to look forward to other important objects. She knows the value of the country which is washed by the Mississippi. It is also well known to the nations of Europe. By the cession of her right to it she is satisfied that she can procure important advantages in commerce from any of the maritime powers in Europe. Some of the northern potentates, who have means of giving validity to our claims, would consider an establishment, under the restrictions with which we have offered it to Spain, as cheaply purchased by an alliance with us, and a much greater advance in money than we have yet thought of asking from Spain, if our present wants should make it expedient to pursue this Idea. Spain has not laid such obligations upon us, notwithstanding our respectful and patient attention to her, as to render us chargeable with the slightest degree of ingratitude in so doing. You will, therefore, persist in the line in which you now are, declaring explicitly that the sessions you propose are only dictated by your desire to make early and vigorous efforts against the common enemy; that if they are not accepted so soon and upon such terms as to afford you a prospect of obtaining this desirable end, you will not consider your offers as binding upon you. I am persuaded that in this I speak the sentiments of Congress, and you may deliver them as such. Your never having spoke of the answer of France, Spain and Great Britain to the proposals of the mediators makes me doubt whether you have seen them. That of Spain I have not seen. If I can get the others copied, and cyphered before this Vessel sails, I will send them to you, if not I will enclose so much of the answer of France as relates to Spain. I see and you will see a use that may be made of it—3 No incidents since my last have turned up worth communicating, the Enimy are drawing Lines across New York Island at Mr. Eliots;4 and making every preparation for defence— The Eastern and Northern States and some of the Southern States are using the most vigorous Exertions to obtain a respectable force for the opening Campaign. France has lent us six million of livres for this year [5,000,000]5 of Dollars from Spain is all that is necessary to enable us to make the most spirited ex[er]tions Our Army is at present well clad, and well fed, and as well disciplined as any Army in the world The force at West Point by the twentieth of May will amount to about 10,000 men and will gradually increase till September as the recruits can be collected; so that our operating force there, including the French troops, will amount by the beginning of June to about 15 or 16,000 men exclusive of militia, which may be called in if necessary I mention this because, I know great misrepresentations have gone abroad on this subject, I have just received a letter from Mr. Carmichael, which I shall answer if possible by this conveyance,6 be pleased to present my Compliments to him, and the rest of your family. I am Dear Sir with great Esteem and Regard your most obedt. humble Servant