The enforcement of Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton’s 1792 excise tax on distilled spirits met with widespread protest along the Appalachian backcountry.1 Western Pennsylvania constituted a flashpoint as harassment, ostracism, and violence greeted officials sent to implement the measure and residents who publicly supported it. Protesters in the region also sought to coordinate their efforts by electing twenty-four delegates to an extralegal convention held in Pittsburgh from 21 to 22 August 1792.

Hamilton viewed the events in western Pennsylvania with alarm as they hindered his plan to raise revenue for paying down the national debt. Moreover, he perceived them as part of an organized sedition that constituted a critical threat to the continued functioning of the federal government. He therefore urged Washington that the nation’s executive not respond in a conciliatory manner, but instead take “vigorous & decisive measures” that would enable officials to effectively execute the law, punish offenders, and stifle any further resistance to government authority.2

The federal judiciary should also aid in these endeavors, Hamilton observed, by using the upcoming Circuit Court meeting in York, Pennsylvania, as a venue for condemning the anti-excise movement. Writing to Jay two days later, Hamilton repeated his proposal that the Circuit Court bench should address the unfolding crisis in Pennsylvania. The letter warned of the particular danger posed by the Pittsburgh convention: “You will observe an avowed object is to—‘obstruct the operation of the law.’”3 Since the chief justice held the rule of law as sacrosanct, Hamilton surmised that Jay would use all legal resources at his disposal to ensure that this principle would not be subverted.

Hamilton also sought out Jay’s support on having the President adopt an active role in suppressing the protest. Washington, he insisted, should issue a proclamation condemning the anti-tax resistance, and moreover, lead troops in the field if the “application of force should appear to be unavoidable.”4 Hamilton submitted a final suggestion that Jay confer with Senator Rufus King of New York who shared their pro-administration outlook.

Jay and King feared that Hamilton’s call for a swift and aggressive course of action would exacerbate the situation and garner popular sympathy for the protesters. Jay recognized that a cohesive government policy could not be successfully implemented, let alone formulated, unless the nation’s leaders first won over public approval by exercising moderation and patience. “Let all the Branches of Govt. move together,” he advised Hamilton, noting the further necessity of cultivating a government consensus.5

The specific recommendations that Hamilton forwarded were also rejected by Jay on the grounds that such strategies would damage the credibility of the federal government. The opponents of the excise, he cautioned, would seize upon a presidential proclamation as proof of the executive’s dictatorial power and design to rob the citizenry of their liberty through military violence and legal oppression. Moreover, Jay questioned whether state and federal officials possessed the resolve and resources required for carrying out a military operation. The chief justice also disagreed with Hamilton’s counsel that a “particular charge” addressing the Excise Act should be delivered in the upcoming circuit court session for the District of Pennsylvania.6 Jay would not ignore the issue altogether; during the Spring 1792 term of the Eastern Circuit, he reminded grand jury members that collecting the revenue and paying off debts ranked among “the highest moral as well as political obligations to discharge with the utmost Punctuality and good Faith.”7 Yet the Circuit Court was not the ideal forum for articulating an official response, and Jay was unwilling to have Hamilton’s legislation discussed and defended to the point that it became the centerpiece of a judicial charge. He advocated that Washington should lay out the government’s position regarding the ongoing resistance to the Excise Act during his presidential address before the next session of Congress, and that Congress in turn should express its views through its reply to Washington’s address.

Although Secretary of War Knox favored issuing the proclamation, other cabinet members echoed Jay’s misgivings about adopting an overly aggressive response. After reading the proclamation draft prepared by Hamilton, Attorney General Randolph expressed doubt that the actions in Pittsburgh were in fact illegal and further advised that the more inflammatory sentiments contained therein should be toned down.8 Secretary of State Jefferson sympathized with the protesters’ plight and opposed Hamilton’s excise plan, but nonetheless, acquiesced to attaching his signature alongside Washington’s to a revised draft of the proclamation which was issued in mid-September.9 Even with the removal of its more bellicose language, the revised proclamation and the subsequent government actions could not prevent the growing discontent in western Pennsylvania and eventual outbreak of open rebellion in the region in 1794.10