To John Jay from Edmund Randolph, 6 May 1794
From Edmund Randolph
Philadelphia May 6. 1794
Sir
The mission upon which you are about to enter as Envoy Extraordinary to the court of London, has been dictated by considerations of an interesting and pressing nature.
You will doubtless avail yourself of these to impress convince Mr. Pinckney, our minister in Ordinary there, of the necessity of this measure, and will thus prevent any wound to his sensibility. He may be assured, that it is the impression, which will naturally accompany this demonstration of the public sentiment, and not the smallest abatement of confidence in him, which has recommended a special appointment. Nor will any of his usual functions be superceded except so far as they may be embraced in the present commission. It would be unnecessary to add, but for the sake of manifesting this fact, and removing difficulties which may arise in your own breast, that you will communicate with him without reserve.1
A full persuasion is entertained, that throughout the whole negotiation, you will make the following its general objects— to keep alive in the mind of the British minister that opinion, which the solemnity of a special mission must naturally inspire, of the deep interest strong agitations, excited in the people of the United States, by the disturbed condition of things between them and Great Britain— to repel war, for which we are not disposed, and into which the necessity of vindicating our honor and our property may, but can alone drive us— to prevent the British ministry, should they be resolved on war, from carrying with them the British nation,2 and at the same time to assert with dignity and firmness our rights, and our title to reparation for past injuries.
One of the causes of your mission being the vexations and spoliations committed on our commerce by the authority of instructions from the British government, you will receive from the secretary of state the following documents, viz: the Instructions of the 8th. of June 1793, 6th. of November 1793, and the 8th. of January 1794;3 the secretary of state’s letter to Mr. Pinckney on the 7th. of September 1793,4 Mr. Hammond’s letter to the secretary of state on the 12th. of September 1793;5 Mr. Pinckney’s Note and Memorial to Lord Grenville;6 Mr. Hammond’s second letter to the secretary of state on the 11th. of April 1794;7 the secretary of state’s answer on the first instant;8 a list and sketch of the cases, upon which complaints have been made to our Government;9 and the instructions, given to N. C. Higginson, who has been lately sent, as agent to the British Islands in the west Indies.10
These several papers develope the source of our discontent on this head; the representations, which have been offered, the answers which have been rendered; and the situation of the business at this moment.
You will perceive that one of the principles upon which compensation will be ^is^ demanded for the injuries under the Instructions of the 8th. of June 1793, is, that provisions, except in the instance of a siege, blockade or investment, are not to be ranked among contraband. To a country, remote as the United States are from Europe and its troubles, it will be of infinite advantage to obtain the establishment of this doctrine.11
Upon the instructions of the 6th. of November 1793, Mr. Pinckney has made a representation, and perhaps a Memorial to Lord Grenville; both of which you will procure from Mr. Pinckney. The matter of these instructions fills up the measure of depradation. They were unknown publickly in England until the 26th. of december 179312— there is good reason to suppose, that they were communicated to the ships of war, before they were published, and that in consequence of a private notification ^of them,^ a considerable number of new privateers were sent fitted out— the terms “legal adjudication” in spite of the explanation on the 8th. of January 1794, were most probably intended to be construed away or not, according to events— and many vessels have been condemned under them.13
Compensation for all the injuries sustained, and captures will be strenuously pressed by you.14 The documents which the Agent in the West Indies is directed to transmit to London, will place these matters in the proper legal train, to be heard on appeal. It cannot be doubted, that the British ministry will insist, that, before we complain to them their tribunals in the last resort must have refused justice. This is true in general. But peculiarities distinguish the present from past cases. Where the error complained of consists solely in the misapplication of the law, it may be corrected by a superior court. But where the error consists in the law itself, it can be corrected only by the law-maker, who in this instance was the King, or it must be compensated by the government.15 The principle therefore may be discussed and settled without delay; and even if you should be told to wait, until the result of the appeals shall appear, it may be safely said, to be almost certain that the Judgment in the West Indies will be Confirmed; and this will be sufficient to bring the principle in question with the British Ministry.16
Should the principle be adjusted, as we wish and have a right to expect, it may be adviseable to employ some person to examine the proper offices in London for such vessels, as may have been originally tried or appealed upon, and finally condemned. You will also reserve an opportunity for new claims, of which we may all be ignorant for some time to come. And if you should be compelled to leave the business in its legal course, you are at liberty to procure professional aid, at the expence of the United States.17
Whenever matters shall be brought to such a point, as that nothing remains for settlement but the items of compensation, this may be entrusted to any skilful and confidential person, whom you may appoint.18
You will mention, with due stress, the general irritation of the United States at the vexations, spoliations, captures &c And being on the field of negotiation, you will be more able to Judge, than can be prescribed now, how far you may state the difficulty, which may occur, in restraining the violence of some of our exasperated citizens.
If the British ministry should hint at any supposed predilection in the United States for the French nation, as warranting the whole or any part of these instructions; you will stop the progress of this subject, as being irrelative to the question in hand. It is a circumstance, with which the British nation have no right to object to us; because we are free in our affections, and independent in our government. But it may be safely answered upon the authority of the correspondence between the secretary of state and Mr. Hammond, that our neutrality has been scrupulously observed.19
2. A second cause of your mission, but not inferior in dignity to the preceding tho’ subsequent in order, is to draw to a conclusion all points of difference between the United States and Great Britain, concerning the treaty of peace.
You will therefore be furnished with Copies of the negotiation, upon the inexecution and infractions of that treaty, and will resume that business.20 Except in this negotiation, you have been personally conversant with the whole of the transactions, connected with the treaty of peace. You were a minister at its formation; the secretary of foreign affairs, when the sentiments of the congress under the confederation were announced thro’ your office; and as chief
justice you have been witness to what has passed in our courts, and know the real state of our laws, with respect to British debts.21 It will be superfluous therefore to add more to you than to express a wish, that these debts, and the interest claimed upon them, and all things relating to them be put outright in a diplomatic discussion, as being [more?] certainly of a judicial nature ^to be decided by our courts:^ and that if this cannot be accomplished, that you support ^the doctrines of government^ with arguments, proper for the occasion, not ^and^ with that attention to your former public opinions, which self-respect will justify, without relaxing the pretensions, which have been hitherto maintained.22
In this negotiation as to the Treaty of peace, we have been amused by transferring the discussions concerning its inexecution and infractions from one side of the Atlantic to the other. In the mean time, one of the consequences of holding the posts has been much bloodshed on our frontiers by the Indians and much expence. The British government having denied their abetting of the Indians, we must of course acquit them. But we have satisfactory proofs, (some of which however cannot, as you will discover, be well used in public) that British agents are guilty of stirring up, and assisting with arms ammunition and warlike implements, the different tribes of Indians against us. It is incumbent upon that government to restrain those agents; or the forbearance to restrain them cannot be interpreted otherwise, than as a determination to countenance them. It is a principle from which the United States will not easily depart, either in their conduct towards other nations, or what they expect from them, that the Indians dwelling within the Territories of one shall not be interfered with by the other.23 Interest
It may be observed here, as applicable to ^comprehending^ both of the foregoing points, that the united States testify their sincere love of peace, by being nearly in a state of war, and yet anxious to obviate absolute war by friendly advances; and if the desire of Great Britain to be in harmony with the United States be equally sincere, she will readily discover, what kind of sensations will at length arise, when their trade is plundered; their resources wasted in an Indian War; many of their citizens exposed to the cruelties of the savages; their rights by treaty denied; and those of Great Britain enforced in our Courts— But you will consider ^the inexecution and infraction of the treaty as standing on distinct grounds from the vexations and spoliations; so that no adjustment of the former is to be influenced by the latter.^24
3. It is referred to your discretion, whether in case the two preceding points should be so accommodated, as to promise the Continuance of tranquillity between the United States and Great Britain, the subject of a commercial treaty may not be listened to by you, or even broken to the British ministry. If it should let these be the general Objects:
1. Reciprocity in navigation, particularly to the west Indies, ^and even to the East Indies^25
2. The admission of wheat, fish, salt-meat, and other great staples upon the same footing with the admission of the great British staples in our Ports.26
3. Free Ships to make free goods.27
4. Proper security for the safety of neutral commerce in other respects,28 and particularly
by declaring provisions, never to be contraband, except in the strongest possible case, as the blockade of a port; or if attainable, by abolishing contraband altogether.29
by defining a blockade, if contraband must continue in some degree, as it is defined in the armed neutrality.30
by restricting the opportunities of vexation in visiting vessels: and
by bringing under stricter management privateers; and expediting recoveries against them for misconduct.31
5. Exemption of emigrants, and particularly manufacturers, from restraint.32
6. Free Exports of arms and military stores.33
7. The exclusion of the Terms “the most favored nation” as being productive of embarrassment.34
8. The convoy of merchant ships by the public ships of war, where it shall be necessary, and they be holding the same course.35
9. It is anxiously to be desired, that the fishing grounds, now engrossed by the British, should be opened to the Citizens of the United States.
10. The intercourse with England makes it necessary that the disabilities, arising from alienage in cases of inheritance, should be put upon a liberal footing, or rather abolished.
11. You may discuss the sale of prizes in our ports, while we are neutral; and this perhaps may be added to the considerations, which we have to give, besides those of reciprocity.
12. Proper shelter, defence, and succour against pirates, shipwreck &c.
13. Full security for the retiring of the citizens of the United States from the British dominions in case a war should break out.
14. No privateering commissions to be taken out by the subjects of the one, or citizens of the other party, against each other.36
15. Consuls &c. to be admitted, in Europe, the West and East Indies.37
16. In case of an Indian war none but the usual supplies in peace shall be furnished.
17. In peace no troops to be kept within a limited distance from the lakes.38
18. No stipulation whatever is to interfere with our obligations to France.39
19. A treaty is not to continue beyond 15 Years.40
4. This enumeration presents generally the objects, which it is desirable to comprize in a commercial treaty; not that it is expected, that one can be effected with so great a latitude of advantage.
If to the actual footing of our commerce and navigation in the British European dominions could be added the privilege of carrying directly from the United States to the British West Indies in our own bottoms generally. or of certain defined burthens, the articles, which by the act of parliament 28 Geo[rge] 3. C.6. may be carried thither in British bottoms, and of bringing from thence directly to the United States in our bottoms, of like description, the articles, which by the same act may be brought from thence to the United States in British bottoms, this would afford an acceptable basis of treaty, for a term not exceeding fifteen years, and it would be adviseable to conclude a treaty upon that basis.41 But such a treaty instead of the usual clause concerning ratification shall ^must^ contain the following, “This treaty shall be obligatory and conclusive, when the same shall be ratified by his Britannic majesty of the one part, and by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and Consent of the senate of the other.”42
But if a treaty ^of commerce^ cannot be formed upon a basis as advantageous as this, ^you are not to conclude or sign any such,^ it being conceived, that it would not be expedient to do any thing more than to digest with the British Ministry, the articles of such a treaty, as they appear willing to accede to; referring them here for consideration and further instruction previous to a formal conclusion43
Some of the other points which it would be interesting to comprehend in a treaty, [illegible] may be attended with difficulty. Among these is the admission of our commodities and manufactures generally into the British European dominions upon a footing equally good with those of other foreign countries.44 At present, certain enumerated articles only are admitted, and tho’ the enumeration embraces all the articles, which it is of present consequence to us, to be able to export to those dominions; yet in process of time an extension of the objects may become of moment. The fixing of the privileges, which we now enjoy in the British East Indies by toleration of the company’s government, if any arrangement can be made with the consent of the company for those purposes, would be also a valuable ingredient.45
4. [5.] You will have no difficulty in gaining access to the Ministers of Russia, Denmark and Sweden at the court of London. The principles of the armed neutrality would abundantly cover our neutral rights. If therefore the situation of things with respect to Great Britain should dictate the necessity of taking the precaution of foreign cooperation upon this head; if no prospect of accommodation should be thwarted by the danger of such a measure being known to the British court; and if an intire view of all our political relations shall, in your judgment permit the step; you will sound those ministers upon the probability of an alliance with their nations to support those principles.46
However there can be no risque in examining, what can be concerted with Denmark and Sweden or any other power, against the Algerines. It may be represented to the British Ministry, how productive of perfect conciliation it might be to the people of the United States, if Great Britain would use her influence with the Dey of Algiers for the liberation of the American citizens in captivity, and for a peace upon reasonable terms.47 It has been communicated from abroad, to be the fixed Policy of Great Britain to check our trade in grain to the Mediterranean. This is too doubtful to be assumed, but fit for inquiry.
5. [6.] Such are the outlines of the conduct, which the President wishes you to pursue. He is aware, that at this distance, and during the present instability of public events, he cannot undertake to prescribe rules, which shall be irrevocable. You will therefore consider the ideas, herein expressed, as amounting to recommendations only, which in your discretion you may modify, as seems most beneficial to the United States, except in the two following cases, which are immutable. 1. that as the British Ministry will doubtless be solicitous to detach us from France, and may probably make some overture of this kind; you will inform them that the government of the United States will not derogate from our treaties and engagements with France, and that experience has shewn, that we can be honest in our duties to the British Nation, without laying ourselves under any particular restraints as to other nations.48 ^and 2. that no treaty of commerce be concluded, or signed, ^contrary to^ the foregoing prohibition.
Besides the papers and documents, mentioned in the former parts of these instructions, you will ^have^ received your commission, as Envoy Extraordinary; letters of credence to the king and queen of England, the latter of which, being without superscription, you will address, as may appear proper, and deliver it or not as you find to be right on such occasions;49 four sets of powers, one general, comprehending all the points to be negotiated with Great
Britain; the other three special for each separate point; in order, that you may be prepared to exhibit your authority altogether or by detachment, as may be the most convenient50— copies of Lord Dorchester’s speech to the Indians, the authenticity of which, though not absolutely ascertained, is believed;51 and of certain affidavits, respecting the British interference with our Indians, and a Cypher.52
You are too well acquainted with the nature of the great functions, which you are called to exercise, to render it necessary for me to add the earnest wish of the President of the United States, that your communications to the Secretary of State should be frequent and full, and that you should correspond with our ministers abroad, upon any interesting occasion, which may demand it. For the latter of these purposes, you will avail yourself of Mr. Pinckney’s cyphers.
Your expences will be paid; together with the allowance of thirteen hundred and fifty dollars per annum for a secretary.53
On your return, you will be pleased to deliver into the Secretary of State’s office such papers, as you may possess, of importance, sufficient to be filed there; and will prepare a general report of all your transactions.
Not doubting that you will execute this trust in a manner honorable to yourself, and salutary to the United States, I beg leave to offer you my sincere wishes for your health and safe return.
Edmund Randolph
Secretary of State.
To the hon’ble John Jay Envoy Extraordinary from the United States of America to his Britannic Majesty.
ALS, NHi: Jay (EJ: 00628). C, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04262); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04407). , 4: 10–21; , 1: 472–74.
1. On the manner in which these instructions were developed, and on concern for the impact of the appointment on Thomas Pinckney, see the editorial note “The Jay Treaty: Appointment and Instructions,” above. For JJ’s acknowledgment of Pinckney’s support and of his approval of the treaty, see JJ to ER, 19 Nov. 1794, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04338). For their socializing, see , 331–32.
2. For his report, soon after his arrival in Britain, that war with the United States would be unpopular, see JJ to GW (private), 23 June 1794, ALS, DLC: Washington (EJ: 10613); Dft, NNC (EJ: 08448). Thereafter, JJ repeatedly remarked that he detected no desire for war with the United States on the part of the British government.
3. On these orders, see the editorial note “The Jay Treaty: Appointment and Instructions,” above.
4. TJ’s response to the Order in Council of 8 June. See , 27: 55–59.
5. Here, Hammond discussed the Order in Council of 8 June and claimed that the trade in corn was actually being carried out by the French government and not by individuals. He noted the protections the order provided to neutral shippers, argued that the blockades imposed were consistent with common practice, and stated that the law of nations justified the order under the present circumstances. See , 27: 100–101.
6. For Pinckney’s undated memorandum to Grenville protesting the Order of 8 June 1793, enclosed in his letter to Grenville, 28 Jan. 1794, see , 1: 448–49; and , 15: 669–70.
7. In his letter to ER of 11 Apr 1794, Hammond asserted that Pinckney’s argument that the Order of 8 June violated the law of nations was too broadly based because it failed to take into account the circumstances of the present war. Hammond also noted that Britain’s current treaty with Sweden provided that provisions could be considered contraband and cited an authority that agreed with the British position. See , 1: 449–50.
8. A lengthy rebuttal of Hammond’s arguments given in the letter cited above. See ER to Hammond, 1 May 1794, , 1: 450–54.
9. Not found. See JJ to ER, 6 July 1794, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04274); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04416), in response to which ER informed JJ that this list was not intended to be “more than the forerunner” of documents subsequently sent him and those which were to have been sent by Higginson. See ER to JJ, 20 Sept. 1794, ALS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04324), and C, NHi: King (EJ: 04455).
10. Massachusetts-born Higginson, an attorney in Philadelphia, was instructed to obtain lists of all American vessels captured, to take inventories of their cargoes and their values, to ascertain when the Order of 6 Nov. was known in the islands, to record the date on which captures were made and determine whether they occurred before or after the order was published, to identify the principles on which condemnations were made, to enter motions to have them appealed, to arrange to have impressed sailors returned to the United States, and to keep Pinckney and JJ fully informed of the information he gathered. See Instructions to Nathaniel Cabot Higginson, 11 Apr. 1794, , 6: 174–80; C, NHi: Jay (EJ: 04472); , 15: 605; and , 16: 288–91.
11. For AH’s views on this matter, see “Points to be considered in the Instructions to Mr. Jay, Envoy Extraordinary to GB,” , 16: 319–27; and the editorial note “The Jay Treaty: Appointment and Instructions”, above. For Grenville’s argument, supported by a passage from Vattel, that provisions could be contraband, see Grenville to JJ, 7 Sept., ALS, with enclosed observations, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04318); and Art. 16 of JJ’s draft treaty of 30 Sept., D, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 05006).
12. There is no record of a memorial from Pinckney on the Order of 6 Nov., which was revoked shortly after it was published by the Order of 8 Jan. 1794. See , 1: 430, and the editorial note “The Jay Treaty: Appointment and Instructions,” above.
13. The courts in which the captures were adjudicated were unauthorized. See 429–35, and note 16, below.
14. 492, declares the amount of compensation awarded by the commission “remarkable.” The mandate to procure compensation for British spoliations was the primary and one of the few clear instructions given JJ by ER. AH, however, had taken the position that, if JJ could achieve substantial gains with regard to the issues related to the peace treaty, he could be more flexible with regard to compensation. See AH to JJ, 6 May 1794, above. For JJ’s compliance with this instruction, see his representation to Grenville, 30 July, ADS, UkLPR: FO 95/512 (EJ: 04984); and Art. 5 of JJ’s draft treaty, 30 Sept., D, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 05006).
15. For JJ’s report of his discussion of this matter with Grenville, see JJ to ER, 6 July, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04274); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04416).
16. Despite the flagrant deficiencies in the proceedings by which American vessels had been condemned, ER correctly assumed that Grenville would require that the cases should be appealed before the British government interposed in them. See note 13, above; JJ to Grenville, 30 July, ADS, UkLPR: FO 95/512 (EJ: 04984); and Grenville to JJ, 1 Aug., ALS, NHi: Jay (EJ: 04466). The process of collecting and presenting evidence was complicated and tedious. The Spoliation Commission established under the Jay Treaty began to operate soon after the treaty negotiations concluded and generally decreed compensation to American claimants. It did not conclude its operations until 24 Feb. 1804. See 438–52; and , 439–41.
17. Pursuant to ER’s orders, JJ retained Sir William Scott (Baron Stowell), British Advocate General, whom Grenville also consulted, and Dr. John Nicholl, and so informed ER. Although Scott informed Grenville that the condemnations were “utterly null and void,” both men advised JJ that the plaintiffs would have to bring their complaints about them to the High Court of Admiralty for a decision since there were no legal Admiralty courts in Martinique. Soon thereafter, JJ informed ER that the King and Council had issued an Order in Council on 6 Aug. extending the time for the American complainants to appeal condemnations, and that Scott was preparing instructions for Americans with claims on how to bring them forward. See JJ to ER, 6 July, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04274); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04416); Scott to JJ, 2 Aug., AL, NNC; JJ to ER, 9 Aug., enclosing the Order of 6 Aug., ALS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04303), and C, NHi: King (EJ: 04435); and 21 Aug., ALS, DNA: Jay Despatches (EJ: 04307), and C, NHi: King (EJ: 04440); , 1: 482–84; and , 428–29, 437. Among the many pieces of correspondence on his mission, JJ included Scott’s letter and the instructions in a lengthy report. See JJ to ER, 13 Sept., LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04312), which closed with his recommendation that the instructions sent by Scott should be printed in pamphlet form and published for general information.
18. On the appointment of Samuel Bayard as agent for American merchants’ claims, see , 17: 128–29.
19. For Grenville’s comments on Monroe’s Speech to the French Convention of 15 Aug., and ER’s letters to the Committee of Public Safety of 10 June, delivered on that occasion, see Grenville to JJ, 7 Sept. 1794 (private), C, UkLPR: FO 95/512 (EJ: 03987); and JJ to Grenville of the same date, ALS, UkLPR: FO 95/512 (EJ: 05005). Without mentioning Grenville’s letter, JJ communicated his concerns that the perception that the United States was inappropriately biased in favor of France endangered his negotiations with Grenville. See JJ to AH, 11 Sept., ALS, DLC: Hamilton (EJ: 10768); Dft, NNC (EJ: 05648; to ER (private), 13 Sept., ALS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04311); to GW, 13 Sept., , 16: 676–79; and ER to JJ, 12 Nov. (private), LS, NHi: Jay (EJ: 00618).
20. Probably TJ to Hammond, 29 May 1792, , 23: 551–613.
21. See JJ’s Charge to the Grand Jury, Circuit Court for the District Of Virginia, 22 May 1793, above.
22. In his initial draft convention and in a later draft treaty, JJ proposed establishing a commission to settle the claims of British creditors who could not obtain satisfaction from American courts, compensation for their losses and damages to be provided by the United States government. See JJ to Grenville: Draft Convention and Treaty of Commerce, 6 Aug., AD, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 04990); and Art. 6 of JJ’s draft treaty, 30 Sept., D, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 05006). For AH’s view that settlement of the claims of British creditors might incline the British government to conclude a treaty, see AH to JJ, 6 May, above.
23. On Dorchester’s and Simcoe’s incitement of Indians in the northwest, see JJ to ER, 6 July, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04274); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04416); and ER to Hammond, 20 May 1794, , 1: 461; , 253–70; and , 218–52.
24. On the decision not to identify which party was the first to violate the treaty, see Grenville to JJ with observations, 7 Sept., LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04274); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04416); and the preface to JJ’s draft treaty of 30 Sept., D, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 05006).
26. For ER’s subsequent reservations about the possibility that distinctions between British and American shipping would be eliminated, see ER to JJ, 15 Dec., LS, NHi: Jay (EJ: 00620).
27. See Art. 15 of JJ’s draft treaty of 30 Sept., D, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 05006). Art. 19 provided that goods of either party found on a ship enemy to the other would be considered enemy goods.
30. In effect, ER was asking Britain to accept the principles of the League of Armed Neutrality as expressed in the Empress of Russia’s Declaration regarding the Commercial Rights of Neutrals of 28 Feb. 1780. It was specified there that, to be considered blockaded, a port had to be “so well shut up by a fixed and sufficient number of vessels belonging to the power which attacks it that one can not attempt to enter into such a port without evident danger.” The declaration also provided that neutral vessels should be free to navigate freely from one port to another, even along the coasts of belligerents, and free ships made free goods, including the property of belligerents. See Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States (6 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1889), 3: 607–8.
32. JJ did not address this matter.
33. Art. 16 of JJ’s draft treaty of 30 Sept. defined these goods as contraband.
34. Art. 11 of JJ’s draft treaty of 30 Sept. avoided the exact term but provided for most favored nation status for the two parties.
35. JJ’s draft treaty of 30 Sept. did not address convoys.
39. Under cover of a letter to ER, JJ enclosed copies of three letters he had sent to Monroe explicitly stating that there was no provision in the treaty just negotiated that should be construed or operate against any of the existing treaties between the United States and other nations. See JJ to Monroe, 24 Nov., Dft, NNC (EJ: 09621), and C, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–94 (EJ: 04355); JJ to Monroe, 25 Nov., Dft, NNC (EJ: 09622), and C, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–94 (EJ: 04356); JJ to Monroe, 28 Nov. 1794, C, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–94 (EJ: 04357), and C, NN: Monroe (EJ: 01070); JJ to ER, 7 Jan. 1795, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04345); , 1: 516.
40. Article 28 of the final treaty provided that its first ten articles were to be permanent and that subsequent articles, except the twelfth, would expire in twelve years.
41. The additional article appended to the treaty suspended Article 12, which defined the conditions under which the United States could participate in trade with the British West Indies, which were rejected by the United States as unacceptable.
42. Each of JJ’s four “powers” contained this specification. See , 1: 471–72.
43. On the decision to merge two separate treaties into a single treaty of amity and commerce, see JJs draft treaty of 30 Sept., D, UkLPR: FO: 95/512 (EJ: 05006). For views he expressed earlier on the inexpediency of concluding treaties of commerce, see JJ’s Report on a Draft of a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 17 May 1785, , 4: 87–89.
44. See note 34, above.
46. For ER’s continued interest in having JJ explore the possibility that the United States would join the convention Sweden and Denmark had signed on 27 Mar. 1794 to maintain the rights of neutral commerce, see ER to JJ, 27 May, C, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04263), Cs, NHI: King (EJ: 04408), and NNC (EJ 07069), and C, partially encoded, NNC (EJ: 08632); , 1: 474; , 16: 542–43. For France’s attempt to mobilize all neutral states in an effort to modify Britain’s naval policies, for the terms of the Swedish-Danish Convention, for the efforts of those nations to persuade Pinckney to have the United States accede to it, and for Grenville’s concern that the United States would do so, see , 304–17, 337–45, refuted by , 411–12; Charles R. Ritcheson, “Thomas Pinckney’s London Mission, 1792–1796, and the Impressment Issue,” International History Review 2, No. 4 (Oct. 1980): 526–29; and , 352–53.
47. JJ reported that Grenville showed a willingness to “interpose” on behalf of the United States with Algiers and other Barbary states hostile to it. See JJ to ER, 19 Nov., LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04338); and C, NHi: King (EJ: 00465).
48. For his report on Britain’s demeanor with regard to France, see JJ to ER, 19 Nov. 1794, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04338), and C, NHi: King (EJ: 00465).
49. See GW to the King, 5 May, LS, UkLPR (EJ: 04963 and EJ: 04972), and , 1: 470; and to the Queen, 6 May 1794, LS, UkLPR (EJ: 04961). For his report on his reception by the monarchs, see JJ to ER, 6 July, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04274); C, NHi: King (EJ: 04416).
50. For JJ’s general powers, see DS, NNC (EJ: 07354), C, UkLPR (EJ: 04964); on issues regarding the armistice and peace treaty, DS, NNC (EJ: 07355), C, UkLPR (EJ: 04964); on British spoliations against American commerce, DS, NNC (EJ: 07357); and to negotiate a treaty of commerce, DS, NNC (EJ: 07356); , 1: 471–72. JJ delivered his general power to Grenville on 20 June. See JJ to ER, 23 June, LS, DNA: Jay Despatches, 1794–95 (EJ: 04272), and C, NHi: King (EJ: 04414); , 1: 476. It authorized him to “agree, treat, consult, and negotiate, of and concerning all matters and causes of difference, subsisting between the United States and his said Majesty,” regarding his instructions to his ships of war and privateers, especially those of 8 June and 6 Nov. 1793, and 8 Jan. 1794; the restitution or compensation for captures and seizures of the property of American citizens by the king’s warships and privateers, and retribution for all injuries received from them.
51. For a copy of Dorchester’s speech, in which he asserted that the United States had violated the boundary line drawn in the Treaty of 1783 and that he anticipated Britain would soon be at war with the United States, see , 15: 417.
52. Grenville’s papers contain a copy of JJ’s cypher. See , 317.
53. On the cost of the treaty, see the editorial note “The Jay Treaty: Appointment and Instructions,” above.