It is unhappily they Case both with Respect to measures and to Persons that their opponents seldom confine their Censures to those ^such^ Things only which ^as^ are worthy of Blame—unless on this Principle it is not easy ^difficult^ to account for the Conduct of those who ^either^ condemn the proposed Constitution in the aggregate, and treat with Severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it—

The 2 Sec. gives Power to the President and “by and with the Advice and consent of the Senate to make Treaties provided two thirds of the Senators concur present concur—[”]

The power of making Treaties is unquestionably a very important one, especially as it relates to war Peace & commerce, and should not be vested in any Man or Body of Men ^[declare?] delegated^ without such precautions in the con mode of constituting them as that the Nation shall may have the highest Security wh. the Nature of the Case will admit of, that it will be exercised by Men the most best qualified for the purpose, and in the Manner most conducive to the public good—The ^Framers of^ the constitution appear to have been particularly attentive to both these Points—They have directed the President to be chosen by a select bodyies of Electors to be convened for the express purpose, and have referred the appointment of Senators to the State Legislatures. These1

This mode has ^in such Cases^ vastly the advantage of Elections in such Cases by the People in their collective Capacity, whether where the supiness of many, and ^where^ the activity of Party Zeal operating on ^taking advantage of the Supiness^ the Ignorance the Hopes and the Fears of [illegible] ^of the unwary & interested [illegible]^ frequently places Men in office by the votes of a small Proportion of the Electors, and men too with whom the great body of Electors have not always Reason to be satisfied—

As the assemblys State Electors for President as well as the State Legislatures, will be ^for the mos^ ^in general^ composed of the most enlightened and respectable Citizens, there is the highest Reason to presume that that ^their^ appointments to these great national offices will be discreet judicious, or in other Words that the ^Fœderal^ President & Senators so chosen will be thos men who had become eminently distinguished by their Virtue and Talents—nay so exceedingly cautious has and attentive were in Convention that in providing for this object, that by excluding men und[er] 35 from the first office, and under 30 from the second, that they have confined the Electors to Men of whom the People have had Experience, and with Respect to whom they will be in no Danger of being decieved by those brilliant appearances of Genius and Patriotism which like transient Meteors sometimes mislead as well as dazzle—

From the manner in which they are to be appointed it is reasonable to infer that the power of making Treaties will be exercised by the most able and honest Men to be found in the Country U.S. for if the observation be just that wise Kings will always be served by wise ^able^ ministers, it is natural to presume that as an assembly of select Electors possess me in a higher Degree than Kings the means of extensive ^& accurate^ Information relative to Men & their Characters, so it in the same Degree will their appointments be in general more discreet, and less liable to ^and judicious^

Such men The ^Presidt. & Sen[ato]rs so chosen as will doubtless be of the number of those ^in each^ State who best understand its Interests, whether considered in Relation to the other States or to foreign Nations; and we must suppose that that the members from each ^State^ however well disposed to promote the general good of the whole, will yet be still more strongly disposed to promote that of their immediate Constituents—

Altho the absolute necessity of System in the conduct of any Business is universally known & acknowledged, yet the high Importance of ^it^ in national affairs has not yet made an become sufficiently impressed on the public mind—They who which ^wish^ to commit the power under Consideration to a popular assembly composed of members constantly coming and going in quick Succession, seem not to be apprized ^recollect^ that such a Body must necessarily be inadequate to the Attainmt. of those great objects which require to be steadily contemplated in their various Relations and Circumstances, and which can only be approached and atchieved by measures which not only Talents but accurate Information & often much Time are necessary to concert and to execute

It was wise therefore in the Convention to provide ^not only^ that this power shd. be exercised by the ablest men, but also that they should continue in Place a sufficient Time to become well acquainted with our national Concerns, and to form and introduce ^a^ System for the management of them—by this Provision they will be in Capacity to make daily additions to their Stock of political Information and be enabled by Experience to render it more & more beneficial to the Country—nor did the Convention manifest less prudence in directing the manner prescribed for periodical Recall of a certain Proportion of the Senators—for thereby the Right & Expediency of frequent Elections are secured to the People, and yet in a way which does not commit them ^in so prescribing for the the frequent Election of Senators^ ^in such a way^ ^as to^ obviates the Inconvenience of ^periodically^ committing those great affairs to ^new^ Men unacquainted with [late & man?] their exact Situation & circumstances, but on the contrary ^for^ by leaving a considerable Residue of the old ones in place uniformity and order will be preserved, and and the constant ^as well as a constant^ Succession of Information provided from an the first to the latter Members, will be preserved—

It will not be denied that the affairs of Trade and navigation should be regulated by a System wisely formed and steadily pursued—It ^is^ also well known that these affairs will be regulated ^that^ whatever may be the System that our Treaties with foreign nations as well as our Laws on on the Subject shd. be conformable to it—It is highly important therefore that this uni^con^formity shd be preserved; of this ^and^ the Convention appears to have been apprized, for by making the Concurrence of the Senate necessary to both, there is little Danger of th ^have taken^ effectual Care is taken that our Treaties & our Laws shall always harmonize and unite in promoting the Attainment of the same interesting ^national^ objects—

Let it also ^to^ be remembered that in forming Treaties of Peace and Treaties of ^& of^ Commerce & particularly the formerg, it often happens that perfect Secrecy and great ^immediate^ Dispatch are requisite There are Cases when ^the most useful^ Intelligence of great Importance may be obtained provided the Parties possessing & conveying it have no Reason to apprehend ^a^ Discovery—and whether those Parties be influenced either by mercenary or ^by^ friendly Motives m will make but little Difference, for in either Case a Discovery w might be equally fatal to them—It is not rash to presume that there are many of both Descriptions who would rely on the Secrecy of the President, ^but^ who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly—The Convention have done well therefore in so disposing of this power of making Treaties, as that while they ^altho^ the president is restrained by ^must ^^in forming them^^ act by the^ the Advice and Consent of the Senate, yet that all he will be under no obligations to ^he will be able to manage all affairs^ of secret Intelligence in the Way which Prudence [sound?] and Circumstances may suggest—The Propriety of these Remarks might be illustrated by Facts well known to many but which it would not be adviseable to render more public—

They who have turned their Attention to the Affairs of Men well know that there is a ^are^ Tides in them—a Tides exceedingly irregular in its ^their^ Duration Strength & Direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly in the same Manner and Measures To observe ^discern^ and profit by [suc?] ^these Tides^ in national affairs, in ^is^ the Business of those Politicians who preside over nations ^them^—in doing this Days and even Hours are ^often^ precious, and Dispatch indispensable—The intervening Death of a Prince, the removal of a Minister ^in short^ the least change in the present posture of affairs may terminate this Tide forever ^give a favorable Tide an opposite Course^

For this As in the Field so in the Cabinents^t^ there are moments to be seized as they pass; and in such Cases consequently the Power of improving such fortunate Seasons should not ^neither our Governors as well as ^^or^^ our^ Generals should not be restrained from improving them—These observations we have in more Instances than one suffered exceedingly from the Delays inseparable from our present Govt. and we have much Reason to rejoice that the proposed Constitution has so well provided agt. them—^for^ many preparatory m and collatoral measures relative to negociations may be taken by the President and whose^en^ such as require the Concurrence of the Senate moccur, he may at any Time convene them—Thus does the constitution give to the formation of Treaties all the advantages of ^Sec[rec]y and^ Dispatch on the one Hand and of deliberate Council on the other—

But to this Plan as to all others that have ever appeared in the World, with out excepting even those which descended from heaven, objections have be^en^ contrived and urged

Some object because the Treaties so made are to have the Force of Laws, and therefore that the makers of them will so far have legislative power—and This objection is a mere play on the word legislative—Is not the Commission of the King of Great Britain to a Judge or a general as valid in Law and as obligatory on all whom it may concern, as if the Judge or the General had been commissioned by Act of Parliament—If the People from whom only civil Power can derived think it expedient by their Constitution to give to th a King the power of issuing such Commissions, they must be as much bound by such royal Acts, and ^as^ they are by those acts which they authorize their Legislature to pass—

The People of america knowing that they would have occasion to make Treaties or Bargains with other nations appoint certain men in their name to make those Bargains surely the Bargains for them—Again the People of america knowing that Laws regulating their general affairs would be necessary, think proper to appoint certain other men to make such Laws then—Surely in the one Case as in the other the Acts of these Men must have equall

Whatever name therefore be given to the obligation of Treaties or to those who make them, certain it is that if it originates ^the authority under^ or whether the making them be called the Exercise of legislative or ^of^ any other kind of authority certain it is that the people have a Right to dispose of the power to make them as they think expeddient—and if in ^&^ when made conformably to the power delegated must be valid and inviolable—

^[in margin] Others seem uneasy that Treaties are to be the sup[reme]. Laws of the Land^ It is not easy even to suspect Gentlemen of being serious when they profess to believe and insist that Treaties like acts of assembly should be repealable ^at our will & pleasure^—A Treaty is only another name for a Bargain or a Contract, and have we any ^no^ Reason to expect ^or hope^ that any Nation or any private Man of Common Sense can be found, who would consent to make any bargain with us which so far from being binding us should mutually binding, should by us be carved, and construed, extended, contracted or annulled just as the Wisdom or Convenience of our Legislature or Legislatures might ^think^ most convenient and advantageous

They who make Laws may without doubt repeal ^them^ and it is equally true that they who make Treaties may alter or annul them—but we are not to forget that Treaties are made not by one of the contracting Parties but by both, and consequently the same ^that as the^ Consent of both to ^was essential to^ make[in]g them at first, will forever ^so must it ever^ afterwards be necessary to alter or cancel them—2The proposed constitution therefore has not in the least extended the obligation of Treaties—They were ^are^ just as binding and just as far beyond the ^lawful^ Reach of legislative Acts before the Convention convened now as they will be at any ^future^ period or any ^under future^ Govt whatever—

However ^altho how useful^ Jealousy may be a republican^s^ Qualification ^Requisite Qualification^ (for a virtue it never was nor will be) yet that Requisite ^Qualification^ may abound too much in public Bodies as ^yet when like^ Bile however good sometimes abounds too much in naturel Bodies when that is the Case in Either way it is not uncommon for us we are sometimes unable to see things in their true Colours, and ^we^ ^in the natural^ ^does too much in the Body politic the Eyes of become^ become very liable to be decieved by ^these^ delusive appearances which our ^that^ Malady gives to surrounding Objects—

Will the President and Senate make Treaties with an equal Eye to the Interests of all the States—will not the two thirds often be tempted to oppress the remaining third—will not the Influence of the eastern & middle States generally preponderate in that Body are these Gent[lemen]. made sufficiently responsible for their Conduct? if they act corruptly can they be punished?—and if they make disadvantageous Treaties how are we to get ^can we get^ rid of them such Treaties—These and similar Questions are may be answered with as much as an It is easy to ask Questions, and objections put into the form of Questions, is as easy a Way

Such Questions really betray and undue Degree of Jealousy every objection m to the fœderal Constitution willh they m imply may at least with equal force be applied to that of this State

Will the Govr & Legislature of new York make Laws with an equal Eye to the Interests of all the Counties—will not the majorit majority often oppress the minority—are these Gentlemen made sufficiently responsible for their Conduct—if they act corruptly can they be punished—and if they ^commissioners^ make disadvantageous Treaties with the Indians or Bargains with the Indians or others can we get rid of them—

As all the States are represented equally in the Senate which is to vote per Capita, they will all have an equal Degree of Influence there, unless it especially if they are careful to appoint their best men proper persons to that Body, and insist on their punctual attendance—In Proportion as the united States assume a national Form and a national Character, so will the good of the whole become more and more an object of Attention; and the Govt. must be a weake one indeed if it should forget that the good of the whole can only consist of the combined Re cannot be promoted without attending to the good of each of the parts or members which compose the whole—the It will not be in the power of the President and Senate to form any Treaty by by which they & their Estates and Families will not be equally bound and affected with [the] Rest of the Community, and having no ^private^ interest distinct from that of the nation they will be under no Temptations to neglect the latter—

As to corruption the Case is not to supposable—a man must either have been very unfortunate in his Intercourse with the world, or possess a Heart not very susceptible of such Impressions; who can think it probable that that the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of such unworthy Conduct—The Idea is too gross and too black to be entertained—But even in such a Case if it shd. ever happen the Treaty so obtained from ^it^ would like all other fraudulent Contracts be null and void by the Laws of Nations—

With Respect to ^the^ Responsibility of the President and Senate, it is difficult to concieve how it could be increased—Every Consideration that can influence the human mind, such as Honor, Oaths, Reputation, the Love of Country, and domestic affections & attachments insure afford Security for their Fidelity—

As the Constitution has provided that they shall be men of Talents and Integrity we have good Reason to be persuaded that the Treaties they make will be as advantageous as all Circumstances considered could be expected. Besides such Individuals among them as may now And so far as the Fear of Punishment and Disgrace can operate, that motive ^to good Behaviour^ is amply supplied and afforded by the Article on the Subject of Empeachments

In short no Plan If Talent and Integrity, if political Information respecting the State of Things at Home and abroad, if Secrecy & Dispatch and the benefit of joint Counsels be desirable

In short as this Plan appears at least in Theory to have greatly the advantage of any that has yet appeared, it certainly merits a fair Trial.