John Jay Papers
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To John Jay from Thomas Jefferson, 23 May 1786

From Thomas Jefferson

Paris May 23. 1786.

Sir

Letters received both from Madrid & Algiers while I was in London having suggested that Treaties with the states of Barbary would be much facilitated by a previous one with the Ottoman porte, it was agreed between mr Adams and myself that on my return I should consult on this subject the Count de Vergennes, whose long residence at Constantinople rendered him the best judge of it’s expediency. various circumstances have put it out of my power to consult him till today. I stated to him the difficulties we were likely to meet with at Algiers and asked his opinion what would be the probable expence of a diplomatic mission to Constantinople, & what it’s effect at Algiers. he said that the expence would be very great, for that presents must be made at that court, and every one would be gaping after them; and that it would not procure us a peace at Algiers one penny the cheaper. he observed that the Barbary states acknoleged a sort of vassalage to the Porte, & availed themselves of that relation when any thing was to be gained by it: but that whenever it subjected them to a demand from the Porte they totally disregarded ^it^: that money was the sole agent at Algiers, except so far as fear could be induced also. he cited the present example of Spain, which tho’ having a treaty with the Porte, would probably be obliged to buy a peace at Algiers at the expence of upwards of six millions of livres. I told him we had calculated from the demands & information of the Tripoline Ambassador at London that to make peace with the four Barbary states would cost us between two & three hundred thousand guineas, if bought with money. the sum did not seem to exceed his expectations. I mentioned to him that considering the incertainty of a peace when bought, perhaps Congress might think it more eligible to establish a cruise of frigates in the Mediterranean & even to blockade Algiers. he supposed it would require ten vessels great & small. I observed to him that Monsr. de Massiac had formerly done it with five; he said it was true, but that vessels of relief would be necessary.1 I hinted to him that I thought the English capable of administering aid to the Algerines. he seemed to think it impossible, on account of the scandal it would bring on them. I asked him what had occasioned the blockade by mr. de Massiac: he said, an infraction of their treaty by the Algerines. I had a good deal of conversation with him also on the situation of affairs between England & the United states: & particularly on their refusal to deliver up our posts. I observed to him that the obstructions thrown in the way of the recovery of their debts were the effect & not the cause, as they pretended, of their refusal to deliver up the posts: that the merchants interested in these debts shewed a great disposition to make arrangements with us, that the article of time we could certainly have settled, & probably that of the interest during the war: but that the minister shewing no disposition to have these matters arranged, I thought it a sufficient proof that this was not the true cause of their retaining the posts. he concurred as to the justice of our requiring time for the paiment of our debts; & said nothing which shewed a difference of opinion as to the article of interest, but and seem’d to believe fully their object was to divert the channel of the fur trade before they delivered up the posts, and expressed a strong sense of the importance of that commerce to us. I told him I really could not foresee what would be the event of this detention, that the situation of the British funds, & desire of their minister to begin to reduce the national debt seemed to indicate that they could not wish a war. he thought so, but that neither were we in a condition to go to war. I told him I was yet uninformed what Congress proposed to do on this subject, but that we should certainly always count on the good offices of France, and I was sure that the offer of them would suffice to induce Gr. Britain to do us justice. he said that surely we might always count on the friendship of France. I added that by the treaty of Alliance, she was bound to guarantee our limits to us, as they should be established at the moment of peace. he said they were so ‘mais qu’il nous etoit necessaire de les constater.’2 I told him there was no question what our boundaries were, that the English themselves admitted they were clear beyond all question. I feared however to press this any further lest a reciprocal question should be put to me, & therefore diverted the conversation to another object.3 This is a sketch only of a conference which was lengthy. I have endeavored to give the substance, only & sometimes the expressions where they were material. I supposed it would be agreeable to Congress to have it communicated to them, in the present undecided state in which these subjects are. I should add that an explanation of the transaction of Monsieur de Massiac with the Algerines, before hinted at, will be found in the inclosed letter from the Count d’Estaing to me, wherein he gives also his own opinion. the whole is submitted to Congress, as I conceive it my duty to furnish them with whatever information I can gather which may throw any light on the subjects depending before them. I have the honour to be with the most perfect esteem & respect Sir Your most obedient & most humble servt.

Th: Jefferson

ALS, DNA: PCC, item 87, 1: 367–70; PrC, DLC: Jefferson (EJ: 10122). Enclosure: Copy of D’Estaing to TJ, 17 May 1786, LbkC, DNA: PCC, item 107, 234–238; Tr, of an extract, DNA: PCC, Misc. Letters (EJ: 10123).

1M. de Massaic was a French naval official who had previously devised a plan to blockade Algiers. TJ, Lafayette, and the Comte d’Estaing were currently planning a similar project to create an “Antipiratical Confederacy” of nations that did not have treaties with the Barbary States, whose object would be to assemble a naval squadron to blockade them. TJ had already informed Monroe about it. See PTJ, description begins Julian T. Boyd, Charles T. Cullen et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (41 vols. to date; Princeton, N.J., 1950–) description ends 9: 318–20, 500–502.

2“It is necessary for us to state [or authenticate] them.” For the significance of this remark to the U.S. claim to East Louisiana, see JJ’s report of 3 Aug. 1786, below.

3See JJ’s reports of 31 Jan. and 22 Mar. 1786; and the editorial note “Anglo-American Affairs,” above.

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