To Alexander Hamilton from Harrison Gray Otis, 17 December 1800
From Harrison Gray Otis1
Washington Decemr. 17. 1800
Dear Sir,
There exists the strongest probability that the electoral votes are equally divided between Messrs Jefferson and Burr. We have certain advices from So Carolina and Georgia, and wait only for intelligence from Kentucky and Tennessee to ascertain the fact. The gentlemen of the opposition are of opinion that this will be the case. The question now is, in what mode shall the friends of the federal government take advantage of this casualty? Can any terms be obtained from Mr Burr favorable to the true interest of the country and is he a man who will adhere to terms when stipulated? Is it advisable to attempt a negotiation with him and in what manner & through what channel shall it be conducted? We are inclined to beleive that some advantage may be derived from it but few of us have a personal acquaintance with Mr Burr. It is palpable that to elect him would be to cover the opposition with chagrin and to sow among them the seeds of a mortal division. But whether in any event he would act with the fri[e]nds to the constitution, or endeavor to redeem himself with his old party by the violence of his measures and the overthrow of the constitution, is a doubt which you may assist us to resolve. Your local situation and personal acquaintance with these men and the State of parties enables you to give an opinion upon a subject in which all the friends to the country have a common interest, and if you can venture to repose confidence in me, I will most solemnly pledge myself that your sentiment shall be received within my own breast, or communicated only to those whom you may designate. Should our expectation be realized which we shall know in a day or two, is it advisable to send a messenger to N York to confer with friends there, or attempt to bring Mr Burr here? What should be the outlines of an agreement with him, and (alas! it is a difficult question) what security can be devised for his adherence to it. I am anxious to act correctly and judiciously. It would be distressing to omit or misdirect an effort which might be beneficial to the country, or preserve the constitution, & I presume that honor and duty will sanction every endeavor to preserve it, even by an ineligible instrument. The Treaty is before the Senate,2 and I believe will be found another chapter in the book of humiliation. All claims for spoliation, it is said, are suspended during the war,3 all public ships captured by each party are to be surrendered,4& in the language of the case of Bullum vs Botum after paying all costs we are permitted to begin again de novo. It is very doubtful in my mind whether the Senate ratify.5 I am Dr Sir
with respect & esteem yr most obedt Serv
H G Otis
ALS, Hamilton Papers, Library of Congress.
1. For information of the presidential campaign of 1800, see the introductory note to H to Theodore Sedgwick, May 4, 1800. For background to the part of this letter dealing with the presidential election of 1800 in the House of Representatives, see H to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., December 16, 1800, note 1.
2. John Adams submitted the Convention of 1800 (Treaty of Môrtefontaine) to the Senate on December 16, 1800 (, X, 767).
3. Article II of the Convention of 1800 reads: “The Ministers Plenipotentiary of the two Parties, not being able to agree at present, respecting the Treaty of Alliance of 6th February 1778, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of the same date, and the … Convention of 14th November 1788, nor upon the indemnities mutually due, or claimed, the Parties will negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time, and untill they may have agreed upon these points, the said Treaties, and … Convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two Countries shall be regulated as follows” (, 458–59). The ellipses are present in the original document. See , 485.
For the Franco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance, both dated February 6, 1778 and for the Convention of 1788, see Miller Treaties, II, 3–47, 228–44.
4. Article III of the Convention of 1800 reads: “The Public Ships, which have been taken on one part, and the other, or which may be taken before the exchange of ratifications shall be restored” (, 459).
5. On December 22, in response to a Senate request of December 19, Adams submitted to the Senate the instructions given to the United States envoys to France (, X, 767–68). The Senate complied with Adams’s request to keep the material confidential by considering the convention in secret session during the first three weeks of January, 1801 (, X, 768). On January 23 the Senate read the report of a committee composed of Gouverneur Morris, Wilson Cary Nicholas, and Jonathan Dayton, which had been appointed to “reduce the several votes on the convention … into the form of a ratification” (, X, 774). The report supported ratification of the convention “… Provided, The second and third articles be expunged, and that the following articles be added or inserted:
“1st. It is understood that nothing in this convention shall be so construed as to operate contrary to any former and existing treaties between either of the parties and any other State or Sovereign.
“2d. It is agreed that the present convention shall be in force for the term of eight years from the time of the exchange of the ratifications.” (, X, 774–75.) After considering the report, the Senate voted to reinsert the second and third articles and to strike out the first additional article proposed by the report. Then the Senate rejected the convention by a vote of sixteen to fourteen (, X, 775–76).
On February 3 the Senate agreed to reconsider the convention and approved a resolution in favor of ratification if the second article of the convention was expunged and an article was inserted providing that the treaty be in force for eight years from the exchange of ratifications (, X, 767–68).
Although it cannot be stated conclusively, it seems likely, as Alexander DeConde has written, that “Apparently the strongest influences in causing the Federalist legislators to change their votes were the general popularity of the convention, and the pressure of the mercantile interests which wanted to end the Quasi-War because it injured business” (DeConde, The Quasi-War. The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797–1801 [New York, 1966], 292).
On March 2, 1801—or two days before the inauguration of his successor—Adams sent the following message to the Senate: “I have considered the advice and consent of the Senate, to the ratification of the convention with France, under certain conditions. Although it would have been more comformable to my own judgment and inclination, to have agreed to that instrument unconditionally, yet, in this point, I found I had the misfortune to differ in opinion from so high a constitutional authority as the Senate, I judged it more consistent with the honor and interest of the United States to ratify it under the conditions prescribed, than not at all. I accordingly nominated Mr. [James A.] Bayard, Minister Plenipotentiary to the French Republic, that he might proceed without delay to Paris, to negotiate the exchange of ratifications; but, as that gentleman has declined his appointment, for reasons equally applicable to every person suitable for the service, I shall take no further measures relative to this business, and leave the convention, with all the documents, in the office of State, that my successor may proceed with them according to his wisdom” (, 388).
Thomas Jefferson completed the work initiated by his predecessor. The new President transmitted the treaty, as modified by the Senate, to France, and on July 31, 1801, the French ratified it with the proviso: “That … the two states renounce the respective pretensions which are the objects of the said article [II]” (, X, 1206–07). On December 11, 1801, Jefferson resubmitted the treaty with the French proviso to the Senate, and on December 19, 1801, the Senate adopted a resolution declaring that the Convention of 1800 was fully ratified (, X, 1207).