Jefferson’s Outline of Policy on the Mississippi Question

Heads of consideration on the Navigation of the
Missisipi for Mr. Carmichael.

• We have a right to the navigation of the Missisipi
• 1. by Nature:
• 2. by Treaty.
• It is necessary to us.
• More than half the territory of the U.S. is on the waters of that river. 200,000 of our citizens are settled on them, of whom 40,000 bear arms.1
  • These have no other Out-let for their tobacco, rice, corn, hemp, lumber, house timber, ship timber.
• We have hitherto respected2 the indecision of Spain, because we wish peace: because our Western citizens have had vent at home for their productions.
• A surplus of production begins now to demand foreign markets.
• Whenever they shall say ‘We cannot, we will not, be longer shut up’
  • The U.S. will be reduced to the following dilemma:
  • 1. To force them to acquiescence:
  • 2. To separate from them, rather than take part in a war against Spain:
  • 3. Or to preserve them in our union, by joining them in the war.
  • The 1st. is neither in our principles, nor in our power:
  • 2. A multitude of reasons decide against the 2d.
    • It may suffice to speak out one: were we to give up half our territory rather than engage in a just war to preserve it, we should not keep the other half long.3
  • 3. The 3d. is the4 alternative we must necessarily adopt.

• How are we to obtain that navigation?5
• (A) By Force
  • 1. Acting separately.
    • That we can effect this with certainty and promptitude, circumstances decide.
    • Objection. We cannot retain New Orleans, for instance, were we to take it.
    • Answer. A moderate force may be so secured, as to hold out till succoured.
    • Our succours can be prompt and effectual
    • Suppose, after taking it, we withdraw our force.
      • If Spain retakes it by an expedition, we can recover it by a counter-expedition and so as often as the case shall happen. Their expeditions will be slow, expensive, and lead to catastrophes: Ours sudden, economical, and a check have no consequences.6
      • We should associate the country to our union.
        • The inhabitants wish this.
        • They are not disposed to be of the Spanish government.
    • It is idle in Spain to suppose our Western inhabitants will unite with them.7
      • They could be quiet but a short time under a government so repugnant to their feelings.
      • Were they to come under it for present purposes, it would be with a view to throw it off soon.8
      • Should they remain, they would communicate a spirit of Independence to those with whom they should be mixed.
  • II. Acting in conjunction with Great Britain, and with a view to partition.
  • The Floridas and island of New Orleans9 would be assigned to us.
  • Louisiana (or all the Western waters of the Missisipi) to them.
  • We confess that such an Alliance is not what we would wish.
    • Because it may eventually lead us into embarrassing situations with our best friend.
    • And put the power of two neighbors into the hands of one.
  • Ld. Lansdowne has declared he gave the Floridas to Spain rather than the U. S. as a bone of discord with the House of Bourbon, and of reunion10 with Gr. Britain.
  • Connolly’s attempt (as well as other facts) proves they keep it in view.
• (B.) By Negociation.
• 1. What must Spain do15 of Necessity?11
  • The conduct of Spain has proved that the occlusion of the Missisipi is system with her.
  • If she opens it now, it will be because forced by imperious circumstances.
  • She will consequently shut it again when these circumstances cease.
  • Treaty will be no obstacle.
    • Irregularities, real or pretended, in our navigators, will furnish colour enough.
    • Perpetual broils, and finally war will ensue.
  • Prudence, and even necessity, imposes on us the law of settling the matter now finally, and not by halves.
  • With experience of the past, and prospect of the future, it would be imbecility in us to accept the naked navigation.
  • With that, we must have what is necessary 1. to it’s use, and without which it would be useless: 2. to secure it’s continuance.12
  • That is, a port near the mouth to recieve our vessels, and protect the navigation. So well separated in jurisdiction and fact as to avoid the danger of broils.13
  • But even this will not secure the Floridas, and Louisiana against Great Britain.
    • If we are neutral, she will wrest those possessions from Spain.
    • The inhabitants (French, English, Scotch, American)14 would prefer England to Spain.
  • II. What then had Spain better do15 of choice?
  • Cede to us all territory on our side of the Missisipi:16
    • On condition that we guarantee all her possessions on the Western waters of that river:
    • She agreeing further, to subsidize us, if the guarantee brings us into the war.
  • Should Gr. Britain possess herself of the Floridas and Louisiana,
    • Her governing principles are Conquest, Colonization, Commerce, Monopoly.
    • She will establish powerful colonies in them.
    • These can be poured into the gulph of Mexico, for any sudden enterprize there.
    • Or invade Mexico, their next neighbor, by land.
      • Whilst a fleet co-operates along shore, and cuts off relief.
    • And proceed successively from colony to colony.
  • With respect to us, if Gr. Britain establishes herself on our whole land-board
    • Our lot will be bloody and eternal war; or indissoluble confederacy.
    • Which ought we to chuse?
    • what will be the lot of the Spanish colonies, in the jaws of such a confederacy?
    • What will secure the Ocean against Monopoly?
  • Safer for Spain that we should be her neighbor, than England.
    • Conquest not in our principles: inconsistent with our government.
    • Not our interest to cross the Missisipi for ages.
    • And will never be our interest to remain united with those who do.
    • Intermediate chances save the trouble of calculating so far forward.
  • Consequences of this Cession, and Guarantee.17
    • 1. Every subject of difference will be removed from between Spain and the U. S.
    • 2. Our interest will be strongly engaged in her retaining her American possessions.
    • 3. Spain will be quieted as to Louisiana, and her territories West of that.
    • 4. She may employ her whole force in defence of her islands and Southern possessions.
    • 5. If we preserve our neutrality, it will be a very partial one to her.
    • 6. If we are forced into the war, it will be, as we wish, on the side of the H. of Bourbon.
    • 7. Our privateers will commit formidable depredations on the Brit. trade, and occupy much of their force.
    • 8. By withholding supplies of provision, as well as by concurring in expeditions, the British islands will be in imminent danger.
    • 9. Their expences of precaution, both for their continental and insular possessions will be so augmented as to give a hope of running their credit down.
  • In fine, for a narrow slip of barren, detached, and expensive country, Spain secures the rest of her territory, and makes an Ally, where she might have a dangerous enemy.