1. In a conference with JJ on 23 Sept. 1780, Floridablanca informed JJ that French and Spanish interests with regard to America were so different that Spain would never agree to be a partner in the Treaty of Alliance, which France had concluded without Spain’s knowledge and without inviting Spain to be a party to it. He also asserted that the treaty and its secret article had nearly caused a rupture between the two nations. See JJ’s notes on this conference, embedded in JJ to the President of Congress, 6 Nov. 1780, DNA: PCC, item 110, 1: 298–315.

2. Article 2 of the treaty specified that the object of the alliance was to “maintain effectually the liberty, Sovereignty, and independence absolute and unlimited” of the United States in matters of government and finance.

3. Congress wavered between hopes that it could conquer the Floridas and persuade Spain to accept this conquest, and willingness to use the Floridas as a bargaining chip to obtain even more desirable objectives. On 5 Aug. 1779, Congress stipulated that if Britain persisted in prosecuting the present war, the American plenipotentiary should “consult on, prepare and conclude, with the ministers of his most Christian and of his catholick majesty, a treaty or treaties, offensive and defensive; in which offensive treaty, nevertheless, he shall insert, on the part of these states, a proper article or articles for obtaining Canada, Nova Scotia, and the islands of Bermuda; and an equal share in, and full acknowledgment of, the equal common right of these states to the fisheries.” Subsequent motions, both passed in the affirmative, added the Floridas and navigation of the Mississippi to the items previously mentioned. A month later, on 9 Sept., Congress expressed the hope that Spain would guarantee both the Floridas, “when conquered,” and “free navigation of the Mississippi into the sea.” It provided, however, that if the Spanish monarch should “positively insist upon the Floridas being ceded to him, and upon the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi” below the thirty-first degree of latitude, the minister was allowed to make these concessions in exchange for a guarantee of Canada, Nova Scotia, the Bermudas, and the fisheries. He was, however, to attempt to procure free commerce for Americans with a port or ports below this latitude, except for any articles the treaty might enumerate, and was to advise Spain that the United States did not wish to continue the war in order to obtain those territories. In the formulation arrived at on 10 Sept., Congress agreed not to preclude Spain’s acquisition of the Floridas and offered to assist the king with “such provisions and naval stores” as the king might require that the states could furnish. It offered to guarantee Spain the Floridas in exchange for free navigation of the Mississippi to the sea, a free port or ports, and an annual subsidy of unspecified amount. Variants on these provisions were discussed on 11, 17, and 28 Sept., at which time Congress also specified that it would like a loan of $5 million at an interest rate of no more than 6 percent to enable it to cooperate with its allies. See JCC description begins Worthington C. Ford et al., eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (34 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1904–37) description ends , 14: 924–26; 15: 1042–43, 1046–47, 1048, 1080–84, 1118–21. On the implementation by Robert Morris of the promises of supplies, see JJ’s notes on a conference with Floridablanca, 23 Sept. 1780, LbkC, embedded in JJ to the President of Congress, 6 Nov. 1780, DNA: PCC, item 110, 1: 298–99.

4. Congress reiterated the instructions on the Mississippi in the letter from the President of Congress to JJ, 4 Oct. 1780, LbkC, PPAmP: Franklin Papers (EJ: 2660). For a reconsideration, see the President of Congress to JJ, 15 Feb. 1781, LS, NNC (EJ: 7750).

5. On 4 Oct., Congress considered adding the salt privileges to its objectives; on 13 and 15 Oct., it considered reports recommending that it attempt to obtain logging privileges as well (JCC description begins Worthington C. Ford et al., eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (34 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1904–37) description ends , 15: 1140–41, 1168, 1179). Spain had previously been forced to concede these privileges to Britain. Spain had, however, made removal of the British from the Bay of Honduras and revocation of the logging privileges on the Campeche coast a war objective in the pact of Aranjuez. If this objective was achieved, French subjects were to be allowed to cut some wood there. For Spain’s hope to use the war with Britain to clear the Gulf of Mexico of all rival powers, see JJ’s notes on a conference with Floridablanca, 23 Sept. 1780, DNA: PCC, item 110, 1: 311; and Bemis, Diplomacy of the Am. Rev., description begins Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Indianapolis, Ind., 1965) description ends 85.